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 „The only way to get rid of temptation is to yield to it.ǲ 
Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray 
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Abstract 
Abundant research from social psychology suggests that self-control weakens temporar-
ily if individuals have to control themselves repeatedly. The consequences of exerted self-
control have become known as depletion effects, yet the mechanisms behind these effects 
are poorly understood. Several models have been proposed, either focusing on depletion 
of a self-control resource or on motivational changes. This background provides an ideal 
starting position to adopt established study designs for neuroscientific investigations. 
Learning about the neural correlates of self-control exertion has the potential to advance 
our understanding of self-control exhaustibility and self-control in general. In my PhD 
project, I examined self-control exertion effects with three fMRI studies. The first study 
replicated findings that the negative consequences of self-control exertion can be over-
come by increasing task motivation on the behavioral level. Yet on the neural level, effects 
of depletion and motivation had interacting effects on brain activity. This supports the 
assumption of a self-control resource, and contradicts alternative motivational models of 
depletion. In the second study, effects of effortful emotion regulation on a subsequent 
resting state were measured, which allowed to examine effects of self-control exertion in 
the absence of task engagement. Emotion suppression led to connectivity increases be-
tween regulatory and task-specific areas beyond task duration, which was related subjec-
tive exhaustion. We propose depletion effects might be associated with a reduced capacity 
of regulatory brain areas to influence further regions and thus control processing of new 
effortful tasks. The third study built on findings which suggested that depletion strength-
ens emotional experiences. It was assumed that depletion should also have beneficial ef-
fects on emotional memory formation. Unfortunately, we were unable to replicate 
findings of increased emotional processing after self-control exertion. Thus our hypothe-
sis about a connection between depletion and emotional memory could not be tested. This 
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and other null findings are reflected in a series of recent meta-analyses, which suggest 
that the depletion effect may be smaller in magnitude than has been assumed. In sum, this 
PhD project provides unparalleled evidence for lingering neural effects of self-control ex-
ertion which are most compatible with self-control resource assumptions. While the 
physiological basis of the self-control resource remains elusive, the present results sug-
gest that self-control exertion might temporarily reduce the capacity of regulatory brain 
centers, such as the inferior frontal gyrus, to adjust to new self-control demands.  
  
  VIII 
Zusammenfassung 
Zahlreiche Studien aus der Sozialpsychologie zeigen dass Selbstkontrolle vorübergehend 
schlechter wird bei wiederholter Ausübung. Die Konsequenzen von Selbstkontroller-
schöpfung wurden bekannt als „Depletioneffekteǲ, die Gründe dafür sind jedoch unklar. 
Verschiedene Modelle wurden aufgestellt, welche entweder auf der Erschöpfung einer 
Selbstkontrollressource oder auf motivationalen Veränderungen basieren. Dies ist eine 
ideale Ausgangslage um etablierte Untersuchungsdesigns für neurowissenschaftliche 
Studien zu adaptieren. Neues Wissen über die neuronalen Korrelate von Depletioneffek-
ten zu gewinnen könnte auch unser generelles Verständnis von Selbstkontrolle und deren 
Erschöpfbarkeit entscheidend vorantreiben. In meinem Dissertationsprojekt habe ich 
Depletioneffekte in drei fMRI-Studien untersucht. Die erste Studie replizierte Befunde, 
dass gesteigerte Motivation den Leistungseinbrüchen nach Depletion entgegenwirken 
kann. Dabei konnten wir erstmals aufzeigen, dass die Auswirkungen von Depletion und 
Motivationsveränderungen auf der Gehirnebene interagieren. Das spricht für die An-
nahme einer Selbstkontrollresource, und widerspricht alternativen motivationalen Erklä-
rungsansätzen zu Depletion. In der zweiten Studie wurden die Effekte einer 
anstrengender Emotionsregulation auf eine anschliessende Erholungsphase ȋ„resting state fMR)ǲȌ gemessen. Dies erlaubte die Untersuchung von Selbstkontrollerschöpfungs-
effekten ohne weitere Taskanforderungen. Emotionsunterdrückung führte zu einer 
Konnektivitätsteigerung zwischen regulierenden und Task-spezifischen Arealen, welche 
länger als der Task anhielt und mit subjektiver Erschöpfung zusammenhing. Wir schlagen 
vor, dass Depletioneffekte assoziert mit einer verminderten Fähigkeit von Regulationsa-
realen weitere Gehirnareale zu beeinflussen und die Verarbeitung eines neuen Tasks zu 
kontrollieren. Die dritte Studie war inspiriert von Experimenten, welche suggerierten 
dass Depletion die emotionale Verarbeitung verstärkt. Wir gingen zusätzlich davon aus 
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dass sich Depletion förderlich auf die emotionale Gedächtnisbildung auswirken sollte. 
Leider konnten wir die Auswirkungen von Depletion auf die emotionale Verarbeitung 
nicht replizieren. Somit konnten wir auch unsere Hypothese, den Bezug von Depletion zu 
emotionalem Gedächtnis, nicht testen. Dieser und andere Nullbefunden decken sich mit 
neuen Meta-Analysen, welche besagen dass die Stärke des Depletioneffekts schwächer 
sein dürfte als bisher angenommen wurde. Diese Doktoratsarbeit legt neue Evidenz vor, 
dass Selbstkontrollerschöpfung nachhallende Effekte auf die Hirnaktivität hat, welche am 
besten mit Ressourcenerschöpfung zu erklären sind. Während die physiologische Basis 
der Selbstkontrollressource unklar bleibt, deuten die Ergebnisse an, dass Selbstkontrol-
lerschöpfung mit einer vorübergehenden verringerten Fähigkeit von regulierenden Hirn-
arealen wie dem Gyrus frontalis inferior zusammenhängt, an neue 
Selbstkontrollanforderungen zu adaptieren.  
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Introduction 
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1 Background 
1.1 Introduction 
Self-control, sometimes also called willpower or self-regulation, is the ability to 
control thoughts, emotions and impulses. It is needed to inhibit dominant responses and 
desires associated with immediate reward in order to align behavior with long-term 
goals, or other personal or societal standards. For example, if somebody wanted to stop 
smoking, self-control is needed to resist the temptations arising from seeing other people 
smoking. Self-control failure is strongly connected with health-related issues, such as sex-
ually transmitted diseases, physical inactivity, obesity and eating disorders, and abuse of 
tobacco, alcohol, and other substances (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996). It is estimated 
that around 40% of premature, preventable deaths are caused by behavioral factors, 
mainly smoking and physical inactivity (Schroeder, 2007). Self-control furthermore pre-
dicts social, educational, and economic success (Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989; 
Moffitt et al., 2011). In fact, self-control is one of the psychological constructs with the 
highest predictive power for life outcomes in general, comparable to intelligence or soci-
oeconomic status (Duckworth, 2011). Hence psychological research has invested great 
efforts in understanding the processes and mechanisms leading to self-control failures 
(e.g. Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010; Hare, Camerer, & Rangel, 2009; Inzlicht, 
Schmeichel, & Macrae, 2014).  
 In the past 20 years, a lot of research in social psychology has investigated condi-
tions which contribute to self-control failure. Over 200 experiments have found that indi-
viduals are worse at self-control when they exerted self-control previously (Carter, Kofler, 
Forster, & McCullough, 2015; Hagger et al., 2010). The traditional model assumes that 
self-control depends on a limited resource, which becomes depleted by use (Baumeister 
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& Heatherton, 1996; Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007). Yet this model has been challenged 
in recent years by theories which assume depletion effects are related to changes in mo-
tivation, not resources (Inzlicht et al., 2014; Kool & Botvinick, 2014; Kurzban, Duckworth, 
Kable, & Myers, 2013).  
Contrasting abundant behavioral studies, hardly any brain imaging studies on self-
control exertion effects were published at the beginning of this PhD project and there are 
still very few today (Friese, Binder, Luechinger, Boesiger, & Rasch, 2013; Persson, 
Larsson, & Reuter-Lorenz, 2013; Wagner, Altman, Boswell, Kelley, & Heatherton, 2013; 
Wagner & Heatherton, 2013). Yet learning about the neural correlates of self-control ex-
ertion provides various opportunities to examine the effects of self-control exertion 
which could not be achieved by behavioral studies alone, potentially making significant 
contributions to the ongoing debate about the mechanisms behind self-control exertion 
effects.  
This is a cumulative thesis with three manuscripts for publication. The introduc-
tory first section will provide an overview of research on self-control and self-control ex-
ertion, presenting different models of self-control exertion. A general framework for the 
neural correlates of self-control will be laid out, followed by a more detailed look at neu-
roscientific depletion studies. An overview of behavioral and neuroscientific research on 
emotion regulation is presented as it is closely connected to self-control. The introduction 
will conclude with the deduction of the research question we sought to answer with our 
studies. The second section contains the publication manuscripts describing the con-
ducted studies. The last section presents a conclusive discussion of these empirical find-
ings.  
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1.2 Behavioral research of self-control and self-control exertion 
In a classic experiment, a marshmallow was presented to four to five year-old chil-
dren (Mischel et al., 1989). The children were left alone and were told they would receive 
a second marshmallow if they managed not to eat until the experimenter returned (ap-
prox. 15 min later). The longer the preschool children were able to resists the sweets, the 
better were their school grades and social skills 15 years later, and the lower was their 
body mass index 30 years later (Schlam, Wilson, Shoda, Mischel, & Ayduk, 2013). These 
findings have been interpreted as a strong indicator for the important role of self-control 
over the lifespan, yet they have also been criticized for not controlling for potential con-
founds such as socioeconomic status or intelligence (e.g. Kidd, Palmeri, & Aslin, 2013). A 
newer study of a complete birth cohort of a town in New Zealand examined the influence 
of self-control measured within the first ten years of life while controlling for intelligence 
and socioeconomic status statistically (Moffitt et al., 2011). Self-control predicted psycho-
logical and physical health, financial autonomy, criminality and substance abuse more 
than 20 years later. These two studies provide convincing evidence for the life-spanning 
predictive power of self-control.  
In addition to studies of individual differences in self-control, social-psychological 
researchers have broadly examined short-term changes in self-control and consistently 
reported that controlling oneself increases chances of subsequent self-control failure 
(Hagger et al., 2010). This line of research is greatly inspired by the strength model from 
Baumeister and colleagues (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Baumeister et al., 2007). 
This model makes two assumptions: First, there is a domain-general self-regulatory 
strength. This suggests that a person who is e.g. good at resisting sweets is also good at 
other forms of self-control such as staying calm under emotional stress. The second as-
sumption is that that self-control strength depends on a limited resource. Self-control has 
Behavioral research of self-control and self-control exertion 
4 
been compared to a muscle, which gets tired with use, but profits from training and re-
generates over time (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). The supposed resource is also 
thought to become depleted with use. The resulting state of reduced self-control strength 
makes self-control failure more likely and has been dubbed depletion or ego-depletion. 
These terms will be used as synonyms for self-control exertion, unrelated to any theoret-
ical frameworks. 
These temporary effects of self-control exertion are typically investigated using a 
dual-task paradigm. Participants complete a first task in one of two conditions, which are 
either demanding self-control, thus inducing depletion, or not demanding self-control. All 
participants subsequently engage in the same second self-control task. The expected out-
come is that participants, who exerted self-control in the first task, perform worse on the 
second. In one study, in the first task all participants were exposed to the smell and sight 
of freshly baked cookies, but only half could try them (control group), whereas the other 
half was instructed to resist them and instead eat radishes (depletion group). The second 
task consisted of an unsolvable puzzle. Participants in the depletion group gave up sooner 
on the puzzle than participants in the control group (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, 
& Tice, 1998). Depletion effects have been demonstrated in very diverse contexts. After 
exerting self-control, individuals performed worse at working memory tasks (Schmeichel, 
2007), took more risks (Freeman & Muraven, 2010), regulated emotions less successfully 
(Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998; Wagner & Heatherton, 2013), ate more unhealthy 
food (Vohs & Heatherton, 2000), and were more likely to show sexually inappropriate or 
aggressive behavior (DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007; Gailliot & 
Baumeister, 2007a). Smokers smoked more after self-control exertion (Shmueli & 
Prochaska, 2009).  
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Hagger et al. (2010) conducted a meta-analysis of 198 experiments which exami-
ned depletion effects with the dual-task paradigm. The authors reported an overall effect 
size of d = 0.62 (Confidence Interval [0.57, 0.67]) for self-control performance, which in-
dicates a moderate-to-large effect (Cohen, 1988). In addition, self-control exertion in-
duced significant changes in effort, perceived difficulty, negative affect, subjective fatigue, 
and blood glucose levels. Moderator analyses favored the assumption of a domain-general 
self-control strength. Hagger et al. (2010) concluded that the findings support the view 
that self-control draws from a single, global, depletable resource and that the strength 
model is a useful explanatory framework for self-control. However, the authors also 
added that the mechanisms underlying depletion effects are not well understood, and that 
other explanations, such as changes in motivation or fatigue, exist.  
One of the major challenges of the strength model is that the supposed self-control 
resource has never been measured directly, but instead its existence is inferred from the 
effects found in the dual-task paradigm. It is unclear what the limited resource actually is. Baumeisterǯs group suggested that glucose is the limited energy source for self-control 
(Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007b; Gailliot et al., 2007). In a series of dual-task experiments, 
they found that self-control tasks lowered blood glucose levels, and that low glucose levels 
after the first task predicted poor performance on the second task. Consuming a glucose 
drink in between tasks eliminated the depletion effect. However, these findings have been 
heavily criticized. Kurzban (2010) argues that cognitive tasks have very little effect on 
brain metabolism and overall glucose consumption. It is biologically highly implausible 
that a measureable effect in blood glucose levels would appear (Raichle & Mintun, 2006). 
Furthermore, Kurzban (2010) reanalyzed the data from Gailliot et al. (2007) and rejected 
the evidence that self-control tasks lower blood glucose significantly. Another study failed 
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to replicate the finding that self-control tasks lowered blood glucose and found that rins-
ing, but not ingesting, the mouth with a sugary drink bolstered self-control (Molden et al., 
2012). The ǲgargle effectǳ, i.e. rinsing the mouth with sugar to enhance self-control, has 
been interpreted as a strong indicator for the involvement of motivational factors in self-
control (Molden et al., 2012; Sanders, Shirk, Burgin, & Martin, 2012). These findings ren-
der the original glucose hypothesis of self-control hard to defend.  
Beedie and Lane (2012) combined motivational factors and limited glucose in a 
new model of resource allocation. Differing from Kurzbanǯs (2010) conclusions, the au-
thors argued that engaging in an effortful self-control task might indeed use bigger 
amounts of glucose and consequently lower the local availability of glucose. However, as 
there is more than enough glucose in the blood, the body is readily able to compensate by 
supplying more blood to the brain area in need. Blood flow is suggested to depend on 
personal priorities. Thus, only if task motivation is high, enough glucose will be supplied 
to areas critically involved in task processing for optimal functioning.  
Besides gargling, a number of further moderators of depletion effects have been 
identified, which point towards the importance of psychological factors. For example, 
meditation (Friese, Messner, & Schaffner, 2012), affirmation of core values (Schmeichel & 
Vohs, 2009), or induction of a positive mood (Tice, Baumeister, Shmueli, & Muraven, 
2007) has been shown to counteract the deleterious effects of depletion on subsequent 
self-control performance. Even lay theories about willpower influence self-control (Job, 
Dweck, & Walton, 2010). Participants who viewed self-control as an unlimited capacity 
did not show the usual performance drop after self-control exertion.  
A prominent study examined the moderating role of motivation on self-control 
(Muraven & Slessareva, 2003). They boosted motivation in half of the participants by let-
ting them believe that the second task would help others, that their efforts could benefit 
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them, or by providing a monetary compensation for their performance in the second task. 
Participants who were motivated by any of these manipulations did not show decrements 
in task performance after self-control exertion. The authors suggested that the results 
confirm a moderator role of motivation in self-control. Ego-depletion may render subse-
quent attempts at self-control more difficult and more effortful, thus additional motiva-
tion is needed to keep participants engaged in the task. Muraven and Slessareva (2003) 
also outlined what would later become known as the resource conservation principle 
(Muraven, Shmueli, & Burkley, 2006). The idea is that individuals are motivated to con-
serve self-control strength, especially if self-control strength has already been partially 
depleted. This is an important clarification of the strength model (Baumeister & Vohs, 
2007), depletion effects may thus not only occur when the resource is completely gone, 
but also when it is partially depleted. As a comparison, imagine you are on a hike and have 
one bottle of water with you. You will try to save water the harder the less there is left in 
the bottle.  
In sum, research has amply demonstrated the significance of self-control in human 
life. Behavioral experiments have shown temporal decrements in self-control in various 
contexts. These depletion effects have been linked to a self-control resource, but the phys-
iological basis of the resource is unclear. Various moderators of depletion effects have been identified, e.g. participantsǯ task motivation.  
 
 
1.3 Different models of self-control exertion 
Question have emerged about the existence of a specific self-control resource. Es-pecially the finding that motivation can ǲundoǳ self-control exertion has led some re-
searchers to argue that depletion effects are due to a loss of motivation instead of resource 
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exertion. This chapter will provide an overview of three alternative explanatory frame-
works for depletion effects and also report the most recent reactions from Baumeister 
(2014) favoring a resource approach.  
 
Process model 
Inzlicht and Schmeichel (2012) were among the first who argued against the exist-
ence of a self-control resource and instead postulated that engaging in effortful self-con-
trol leads to temporary shifts in motivation, attention, and emotion. According to the 
process model (Inzlicht et al., 2014; Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012), individuals seek to bal-
ance externally rewarded cognitive labor and leisure. Cognitive labor has an inherent dis-
utility which accumulates during continued work. As a consequence, a motivated 
switching occurs where individuals start to strive for inherently rewarding leisure. From 
an evolutionary perspective, this is related to finding an optimal trade-off between exploi-
tation of known resources (labor), and disengagement and exploration of other activities 
which may be more gratifying (leisure). Consequently, the process model assumes that 
depletion is not simply less motivation overall. Rather, it is lower motivation to engage in ǲhave-toǳ tasks and higher motivation to engage in ǲwant-toǳ tasks. The shift in motiva-
tional priorities is accompanied by changes in attention and emotion. Signals for inher-
ently rewarding leisure become more salient and associated emotions are experienced 
more intensively, while stimuli signaling cognitive labor are paid less attention and be-
come increasingly aversive on an emotional level. One may critically add that changes in 
attention and emotion could also be explained by a decreased self-control capacity, as as-
sumed by the strength model. One might also question the functionality of task disengage-
ment during a standardized laboratory experiment where chances for alternative, more 
rewarding activities are obviously very low. 
Different models of self-control exertion 
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Opportunity cost model 
Kurzban, Duckworth, Kable, and Myers (2013) reject the resource concept in favor 
of subjective costs. Computational mechanisms or mental operations such as executive 
functions, can be deployed for various tasks, but they can only be deployed for a limited 
number of simultaneous tasks at any given moment. Importantly, this model introduces 
opportunity costs. These are other potential uses of the computational mechanisms which 
cannot be executed during task engagement. Individuals are constantly evaluating the 
costs and benefits associated with task performance and the subjective experience of ef-
fort equals the felt output of these cost/benefit computations, which increases with time spent on task. Consequently, individualsǯ motivation for further deployment of computa-
tional mechanisms in service of the present task decreases over time, leading to perfor-
mance reductions. While this model is formally explicit, it has been criticized that it fails 
to give an adequate reason why the evaluation of opportunity costs should rise with rep-
etition (Cohen & Saling, 2013). Others have argued that the subjective value of alternative 
computational mechanisms should only change over time if task demands are previously 
unknown. Otherwise, effort will depend on previous task experience (Gendolla & Richter, 
2013). As an explanation for task disengagement over time, Kurzban et al. (2013) use the following analogy: „[F]oraging animals [...] can feed in only one patch at any given time 
and, therefore, must decide when to stay in their current patch and when to leave it in 
search of new one [...] When foraging organisms change location, they do so because the rate of return falls below some threshold.ǲ ȋp. ͸͸ͶȌ. )ronically, this is exactly the descrip-
tion of a resource problem. The decision to change locations is based on the availability of 
food, i.e. a resource. The relationship between costs and benefits becomes less favorable 
because the resource becomes sparse.  
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Labor/leisure tradeoff model 
Kool and Botvinick (2013, 2014) propose that the exertion of cognitive con-
trol/self-control carries intrinsic subjective costs. Instead of limiting resources, they ar-
gue that self-control failures occur because individuals choose not to invest effort. This is similar to Kurzban et al.ǯs ȋʹͲͳͲȌ idea in that it centers on subjective costs, but the evalu-
ation of these costs is directly attached to the exertion of cognitive control. The more con-
trol is needed, the higher are the subjective costs. Over time, individuals seek a balance 
between tasks requiring control and task disengagement or rest. This research group has 
focused more on neuroscience than other self-control researchers. Kool and Botvinick 
(2013, 2014) were able to present a neural analogue for subjective costs (Botvinick, 
Huffstetler, & McGuire, 2009). In an fMRI study, the response of the nucleus accumbens 
to a fixed reward value was smaller if it was attached to a high-demanding task than a 
low-demanding task. Furthermore, the decrease in the nucleus accumbens correlated 
with activation of the ACC during the preceding task. Thus the researchers argued the ACC 
may not only monitor task-processing with respect to potential conflicts, but monitor 
more generally information-processing demands. In another fMRI study by this research 
group, participants had to decide repeatedly between a high-demanding and a low-de-
manding task (McGuire & Botvinick, 2010). The higher the activity was in the left IFG dur-
ing the high-demanding task, the more likely participants were to avoid it later. As the 
authors themselves noted, these results can also be interpreted in line with the strength 
model. Prior task engagement could have caused self-control exertion. Hence participants 
chose the less-demanding task because of resource depletion. As a counter argument, 
Kool & Botvinick (2014) conducted a behavioral experiment where participants also 
showed demand avoidance if they had to decide about task engagement prospectively. 
This implies that demand avoidance is not an emergent feature which follows resource 
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depletion. However, according to the resource conservation principle of the strength 
model (Muraven et al., 2006) participants might be motivated to spend as little of the self-
control resource as possible, even if they had not engaged in self-control acts previously. 
Furthermore, from an evolutionary point of view, why would individuals feel a subjective 
cost for self-control if it did not, in the end, depend on a limited resource? Regarding this 
issue, Kool and Botvinick (2014) make two claims. First, the costs might stem from the 
limits of simultaneous information processing. Less demanding tasks leave more space 
for other mental activities. Second, task disengagement allows individuals to survey or 
explore potential alternative activities, thereby preventing focus on suboptimal behavior 
over an extended period of time. These points closely resemble the arguments outlined 
by the opportunity cost model (Kurzban et al., 2013) and the process model (Inzlicht et 
al., 2014).  
 
Reaction to critique and overhaul of the strength model 
An empirical argument against motivational accounts of depletion effects was pro-
vided by Vohs, Baumeister, and Schmeichel, (2013). They showed that increasing task 
motivation could counteract moderate amounts of self-control exertion, i.e. when partic-
ipants completed one initial self-control task. When participants completed three initial 
self-control tasks, performance on the dependent task decreased further, and, critically, 
motivating participants had no beneficial effect on performance any more. The authors 
argue that motivation indeed plays a role in depletion effects, but cannot counter severe 
states of resource depletion. Baumeister (2014) also reacted to the critiques of the glu-
cose hypothesis (see chapter 1.2) by acknowledging that ǲit seems unlikely that ego de-pletionǯs effects are caused by a shortage of glucose in the blood stream.ǳ ȋp. ͵ ͳͷȌ. )nstead, 
he integrated the resource allocation model (Beedie & Lane, 2012), which is in line with 
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the resource conservation principle, into the strength model. Thus depletion effects occur 
because individuals decide not to devote an adequate amount of the stored glucose re-
sources to a task. Baumeister (2014) furthermore emphasized that the selective alloca-
tion of a resource only makes sense if the resource is limited and can be depleted eventually. With respect to the ǲgargle effectǳ ȋi.e. boosting self-control by gargling glu-
cose; Sanders et al., 2012), Baumeister (2014) points out that a small part of glucose is 
already metabolized in the mouth. This might be taken as a clue by the human body that 
more glucose is coming, which lowers the need to conserve the resource. On the down-
side, the strength model remains silent on how glucose storage, shortage, and allocation 
translates to a physiological or neural level.  
 
Three models explaining self-control exertion effects in a motivational framework 
have been introduced. Inzlicht and Schmeichel (Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012) argued that 
participants strive for a balance between labor and leisure, which is perturbed after self-
control exertion. Kurzban et al. (2013) and Kool and Botvinick (2013, 2014) emphasized 
the importance of value-based decision making for self-control, and agree that the driving 
force behind self-control exertion effects are subjective costs. These models struggle to 
explain why motivation decreases with increasing time spent on self-control demanding 
tasks. The strength model has been overhauled. Baumeister (2014) reiterated that the 
limited energy source relies on glucose, but added that the human body has extensive 
stores of glucose. Individuals try to conserve glucose by selective allocation and by in-
creasing resistance to further allocation with increasing levels of depletion.  
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1.4 Neural correlates of self-control The term ǲself-controlǳ has only emerged in the neuroscientific literature in recent 
years (Heatherton & Wagner, 2011; Tabibnia et al., 2011). Yet neuroscientists have stud-
ied related concepts such as cognitive and executive control, interference or conflict res-
olution and even inhibition extensively. The prefrontal cortex (PFC) plays a critical role in 
these processes. It is this area of the brain which orchestrates thoughts and actions in 
accordance with internal goals. It is believed that the PFC maintains patterns of neural 
activity that represent goals and means to achieve them (Miller & Cohen, 2001). Through 
its rich interconnections with all sensory systems, the motor system, and subcortical 
structures involved in affect and memory, the PFC is thought to bias processing in the 
other parts of the brain in favor of goals. A renowned analogy is that the PFC exhibits top-
down control over other brain areas and behavior. I will continue this chapter with a de-
scription of frequently used cognitive control tasks. Then common brain activity during 
cognitive tasks will be presented. Next, I will highlight how the tasks differ on the cogni-
tive level and relate these differences and the respective mental operations to task-spe-
cific brain activity. Finally, I will argue that inhibition is the mental operation which is 
most directly related to self-control and discuss its neural basis further. This approach 
follows the logic introduced by an insightful meta-analysis by Nee, Wager, and Jonides 
(2007). 
Go/no-go task. The task consists of a series go-signals and no-go signals (Fig. 1.a). 
Participants are required to respond as quickly as possible to go-signals but to withhold 
responding to no-go signals. Because the majority of trials consist of go-signals, a prepo-
tent tendency to respond is formed.  
Stop-signal task. On each trial, a Go-signal is presented (Fig. 2.a). Participants are 
instructed to press a button as quickly as possible whenever the Go-signal appears. In a 
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minority of trials, a stop signal is delivered after the go signal, e.g. an additional visual 
input or a tone. Participants must then cease executing an already initiated response. The 
time between the go and the stop signal is usually systematically varied until participants 
succeed stopping the response in 50% of trials.  
Flanker task. In this task, several stimuli appear at once (Fig. 1.c). Participants must 
only respond to the target stimulus in the middle of the screen, while the stimuli to the 
side ǲflankingǳ the target stimuli have to be ignored. )n incongruent trials, flanking stimuli 
cause interference because they are also potential targets but would require a different 
response. In congruent trials, flanking stimuli are the same as the target stimulus, thus 
facilitating processing. In neutral trials, flanking stimuli are left out or are stimuli without 
a response mapping.  
Stroop task. Participants must indicate the color of the ink of letters appearing on 
screen while ignoring the meaning of the word (Fig. 1.d). In congruent trials, the meaning 
of the word and color of the ink match, e.g. ǲgreenǳ written in green ink. Task processing 
is facilitated and participants usually respond fast. In incongruent trials, the meaning of 
the word interferes with the ink color, e.g. ǲredǳ written in green ink. )ncongruent trials 
usually elicit slower response times and more errors. Neutral trials consist of a word with-out a reference to colors or just letters, e.g. ǲXXXǳ.  
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Fig. 1. Tasks commonly used in cognitive control research. (a) Go/no-go task. X, go trials; K, 
no-go trials. Adapted froŵ ͞NeuroprediĐtioŶ of future rearrest͟ ďy E. AharoŶi et al., 2013, 
PNAS, 110, p. 2 of Supporting Information. (b) Stop-signal task. X, go signal; red square, stop 
sigŶal. Adapted froŵ ͞“treŶgth iŶ ĐogŶitive self-regulatioŶ͟ ďy A. BarutĐhu, O. Carter, R. Hes-
ter, and N. Levy, 2013, Frontiers in Psychology, 4, p. 3. (c) Flanker task. Retrieved August 5, 
2015 from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eriksen_flanker_task. (d) Stroop task.  
 
As previously announced, I will now present general activity patterns related to 
cognitive control before revisiting each task and discuss the task-specific brain activity in 
light of different task demands. The meta-analysis by Nee, Wager, and Jonides (2007) im-
plemented a density analysis to identify brain activation patterns based on 47 experi-
ments with the described cognitive control tasks, plus two others (Simon task & stimulus-
response compatibility). When combining all tasks, significant activation clusters were 
found bilaterally in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG, 
sometimes also referred to as ventrolateral prefrontal cortex), anterior cingulate cortex 
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(ACC), insula, and posterior parietal cortex. The authors also performed density analysis 
to examine brain activity related to each task separately, assuming that differences in 
brain activity relate to the mental operations needed for these tasks.  
For the Go/no-go task, the biggest activation cluster was found in the right pre-
frontal cortex, which included the DLPFC and IFG (Nee et al., 2007). Further clusters were 
in the left DLPFC and ACC. In this task, overcoming the prepotent tendency to respond can 
be overcome in two ways. One is to bias processes to select the appropriate response, 
which can be described as attentional control. Participants may pay particular attention 
to specific stimulus features that facilitate discrimination. The other way would be to stop 
or inhibit an inappropriate response from being executed in no-go trials. The exact setup 
of the task is likely to influence the relative contribution of the two mental operations to 
task processing. The more go signals occur before a no-go signal, the bigger is the prepo-
tent tendency to respond. Successful resolution of no-go trials might then depend on re-
sponse inhibition to a larger degree. A few studies have systematically varied the amount 
of go trials before a no-go trial (Durston, Thomas, Worden, Yang, & Casey, 2002; Garavan, 
Ross, Murphy, Roche, & Stein, 2002). They found that activity in the right IFG was in-
creased when the prepotent tendency to respond was stronger. Another study reported 
that an increase in the relative amount of no-go trials led to increased activity in the right 
prefrontal cortex, including the DLPFC (De Zubicaray, Andrew, Zelaya, Williams, & 
Dumanoir, 2000). These findings suggest that the (right) IFG is critically involved in in-
hibiting a predominant response, whereas the DLPFC is associated with more controlled 
style of information processing and response selection.  
In the stop-signal task, the stop signal is delivered after the go signal. Thus partic-
ipants have already initiated the process leading to a response, and must then stop it. Dif-
ferent from the go/no-go task, resolution of the conflict relies solely on motor response 
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inhibition. Consistent with the reasoning above, two fMRI studies of the stop-signal task 
have reported a predominant role of the right IFG for successful response inhibition 
(Rubia et al., 2001; Rubia, Smith, Brammer, & Taylor, 2003). Activation was also reported 
in the presupplementary motor areas (pre-SMA) and the ACC. Further evidence for a key 
role of the IFG in response inhibition stem from lesion studies. Different from neuroimag-
ing, lesion studies can provide evidence what regions are absolutely necessary for cogni-
tive functions. The size of lesions in the right IFG have been shown to correlate with 
response inhibition impairments in the stop-signal task (Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 
2004). Another study recorded intracranial EEG in the right IFG while patients being eval-
uated for epilepsy performed the stop-signal task (Swann et al., 2009). A significantly 
greater IFG response was found for successful than unsuccessful stop trials.  
The Flanker task mainly activated the right DLFPC and right insula. There was a 
significant overlap with activity elicited by the Go/no-go task. Both tasks require selective 
attention in order to bias processing against an inappropriate response. Compared to the 
other tasks, error rates are much lower for the Flanker task. This suggests that there might 
be less need to inhibit erroneous responses during execution. Correspondingly, the IFG 
was less activated in the Flanker task than in the other tasks.  
The Stroop task, like the Flanker task, also requires filtering out irrelevant infor-
mation. However, relevant and irrelevant information are features of the same stimulus. 
Also, reading is highly automated, contributing to the prepotency of the incorrect re-
sponse. Error rates are considerably higher than in the Flanker task. This suggests that 
both selective attention and inhibition are important for correct Stroop task processing. 
Accordingly, activity in the Stroop was found in the ACC, the DLPFC bilaterally, and the 
left IFG. Clusters were much bigger in the left hemisphere (Nee et al., 2007), while the 
activity in right DLPFC overlapped with the one from Flanker task. The bilateral DLPFC 
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involvement might reflect the high demand of selective attention and response selection 
in the Stroop task. The left predominance is probably related to the strong verbal nature 
of the task.  
The ACC was activated in all tasks but the Flanker task in the meta-analysis by Nee 
et al. (2007). Yet another review concluded that the ACC is also reliably activated in the 
Flanker task (Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004). A cognitive process necessary for all tasks 
studied in the field of cognitive control research is the detection of a conflict during infor-
mation processing in the first place. The ACC and adjacent midfrontal areas are implicated 
in conflict detection and error monitoring (Botvinick et al., 2004; Botvinick, Nystrom, 
Fissell, Carter, & Cohen, 1999; Kerns et al., 2004; Van Veen & Carter, 2002). The ACC is 
thought to detect conflict between simultaneously active, competing mental representa-
tions and to alert systems involved in top-down control to resolve this conflict.  
From a social-psychological point of view, inhibition might be what lies most at the 
heart of self-control. In accordance with the reasoning above, research on addiction has 
outlined a key role of the IFG for affective and nonaffective self-control. The size of the 
right IFG decreases with years of drug abuse (Ersche, Williams, Robbins, & Bullmore, 
2013). Furthermore, the decrease in the IFG size correlates with impairments in the stop-
signal task performance as well as emotion regulatory success and loss of control over 
craving in drug users (Tabibnia et al., 2011). Aron, Durston, et al. (2007) have laid out a 
more detailed theory how responses and interruption by the IFG come together in the 
human brain. At first, a go process is initiated by the premotor cortex, which activates the 
primary motor cortex via the basal ganglia. The primary motor cortex then sends the sig-
nal to the relevant muscles through the corticospinal tract. The stop process may interfere 
with the go process by inhibiting cortical motor activity via the pre-supplementary motor 
area, or by influencing activity in the basal ganglia through a subthalamic nucleus-globus 
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pallidus pathway. Crucially, both the subthalamic nucleus and the pre-SMA were found to 
be directly connected with the IFG via white matter tracts (Aron, Behrens, Smith, Frank, 
& Poldrack, 2007; Aron, Durston, et al., 2007). The work from Aronǯs group has specifi-
cally popularized the view of the right IFG as the critical area for inhibition. Both laterality 
and function are not without counter-proposals (e.g. Swick & Chatham, 2014). A lesion 
study (Swick, Ashley, & Turken, 2008) demonstrated that the left IFG is critical for inhibi-
tion as well. Others have argued that the right )FGǯs function is not specifically inhibition, 
but it is more generally involved in the detection of salient or task-relevant cues 
(Hampshire, Chamberlain, Monti, Duncan, & Owen, 2010). Another meta-analysis focus-
ing on Stop-signal and Go/no-go tasks found major common clusters in the anterior insula 
and the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA), but not in the IFG (Swick, Ashley, & 
Turken, 2011). The pre-SMA lies within the medial prefrontal cortex, adjacent to the ACC 
as well as (pre)motor areas. Aron, Behrens, et al. (2007) suggested that the pre-SMA plays 
a role in detection and resolutions of conflicts which are specifically related to motor re-
sponse inhibition. The anterior insula has been related to a wide range of conditions and 
behaviors, including awareness of bodily feelings (Craig, 2009) and conscious error per-
ception (Ullsperger, Harsay, Wessel, & Ridderinkhof, 2010), but its role in inhibition task 
has received little attention. The insula lies in close proximity to both the DLPFC and IFG. 
Nee et al. (2007) found the insula to be generally activated by cognitive control tasks, but 
suggest that there is no conclusive evidence if the insula is implicated in response selec-
tion or response inhibition. However, Swick et al. (2011) argue that the pre-SMA is the 
actual area implementing motor inhibition, while the IFG and insula are involved in atten-
tional control. Further research on the contributions of the pre-SMA, the IFG and insula to 
motor stopping is needed for clarification. 
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In sum, cognitive neuroscience has distinguished three mental operations which 
can be considered core-components of self-control: action/conflict/error monitoring, se-
lective attention/attentional control/response selection, and response inhibition. With 
regard to anatomical regions, the most widespread view is that the ACC is important for 
conflict monitoring and error detection, the DLPFC for selective attention and response 
selection, and the IFG for inhibition, though there is some debate about the exact function 
of the lateral prefrontal areas (DLPFC, IFG). 
 
 
1.5 Neuroscientific studies of self-control exertion 
Only few neuroscientific studies have investigated self-control exertion effects. 
This chapter will describe all which implemented the dual-task design. According to the 
two-stage model of self-control, successful execution of self-control entails first the iden-
tification of a conflict (recognizing the need for control), and second conflict resolution 
(actual implementation of control; Myrseth & Fishbach, 2009). The first two studies ex-
amined which stage was affected by self-control exertion. In an electroencephalogram 
(EEG) study by Inzlicht and Gutsell (2007), participants either had to watch an emotional 
film naturally (control condition) or suppress their emotions (self-control exertion con-
dition). Prior self-control exertion led to slower reaction times in the Stroop task. To an-
alyze the EEG signal, the brain response to trials was averaged to form the even-related 
potential. Relative to the control condition, the self-control exertion condition revealed a 
weaker error-related negativity (ERN), a specific part of the event-related potential, after 
error commission. The ERN is associated with conflict monitoring and error detection 
(Gehring, Goss, & Coles, 1993). Research indicates the ERN originates from the dorsal an-
terior cingulate cortex and alerts top-down control to resolve conflicts and errors (Van 
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Veen & Carter, 2002). The findings from Inzlicht and Gutsell (2007) thus suggest that self-
control exertion impairs the detection of conflict, the first stage of self-control.  
Second, Hedgcock, Vohs, and Rao (2012) looked into the same question using fMRI. 
The first task was an attention-control task where participants looked at a fixation cross 
in the middle of the screen while words appeared periodically around the cross. In the 
self-control exertion condition, participants were told to ignore the words and not to read 
them. In the control condition, they were told that the words could be looked at or ig-
nored. The second task was a choice task, where participants read a scenario description 
first and then had to indicate their preference from a list of options (e.g. choose among 
different college courses). Behaviorally, prior self-control exertion led to faster decisions 
in the choice task. Neurally, self-control exertion decreased activity in the right middle 
frontal gyrus during the choice task, but no changes were detected in the ACC. These find-
ings contradict the ones from Inzlicht and Gutsell (2007) and suggest that self-control ex-
ertion impairs the implementation stage of self-control.  
The third neuroscientific study examined effects of emotion regulation on cogni-
tive performance (Friese et al., 2013). Participants saw emotionally negative pictures and 
had to either suppress their emotions (self-control exertion condition) or leave them un-
changed (control condition). Subsequently they engaged in a Stroop task. Participants in 
the self-control exertion condition showed stronger Stroop interference effects than par-
ticipants in the control group. The authors found that participants in the self-control ex-
ertion condition activated the right middle and inferior frontal gyrus more during the 
picture-viewing task, but less in the subsequent Stroop task, than participants in the con-
trol condition. In addition, Friese et al. (2013) specifically tested for potential changes in 
ACC functioning induced by self-control exertion, but found no differences. This again 
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supports the view that depletion affects self-control implementation. Despite these differ-
ences, these studies adequately demonstrate how self-control exertion effects can be in-
tegrated into a general framework of structures related to cognitive control.  
Fourth, the fMRI study by Persson et al. (2013) is the first to report brain activity 
during both the first and the second task. In the first task, in each trial a set of four letters 
appeared on screen and subsequently a target letter. Participants had to indicate if the 
target letter had been presented before as part of the four-letter set. In the control condi-
tion, all negative targets were nonrecent, meaning that the letter had not appeared in the 
current set or the last two presented sets. In the depletion condition, two thirds of nega-
tive targets were not members of the current set, but were presented as part of the two 
immediately preceding sets. The second task was a verb generation task where a noun 
was presented and participants had to generate a related verb. The nouns had either 
many associated verbs (e.g., ball: throw, kick, bounce, etc.) or few to one associated verb 
(e.g. scissors: cut). Nouns with many associations demanded interference control and par-
ticipants exhibited longer reaction times on these than nouns with few associations. Re-
action times for nouns with many associations were increased even further for 
participants in the depletion condition. Brain activity in the depletion condition during 
the second task was reduced in the left IFG, ACC, striatum and cerebellum, as compared 
to the control condition. Interestingly, depletion increased activity at contralateral sites; 
namely the right inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula, superior temporal gyrus, and the 
posterior insula. A conjunction analysis showed that (part of) the left IFG was activated 
by both tasks. Lastly, the amount of activity decrease in the left IFG (compared to a pre-
depletion verb generation task) correlated with the magnitude of the behavioral deple-
tion effect. The tasks have only been used once in another study which was conducted by 
the same group (Persson, Welsh, Jonides, & Reuter-Lorenz, 2007). Instead of referring to 
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self-control exertion, the authors explain their findings in the context of process-specific 
fatigue, namely interference resolution. Nevertheless, control of interference as de-
manded by these tasks can also be described as inhibition and fits within the self-control 
literature. In sum, this paper provided further evidence that depletion decreases activity 
in areas involved in cognitive control. It is the first study which reported that increased 
activity in prefrontal control areas (IFG) during the first, depletion-inducing task over-
lapped with subsequent activity decreases during the second task. Furthermore, it is the 
only study which reported increased activity after depletion.  
Fifth, Wagner and Heatherton (2013) examined the effects of self-control exertion 
on emotional processing. As a first task, participants watched a documentary film while a 
sequence of unrelated words appeared randomly on screen. Participants in the depletion 
condition were told to inhibit reading the words, while control participants were told they 
could decide freely whether to read the words or not. The second task consisted of watch-
ing emotionally negative, neutral, and positive words while making indoor/outdoor 
judgements. Participants were not instructed how to watch the emotional pictures, but it 
was assumed they would engage in spontaneous emotion regulation (see manuscript 3 
for a more detailed discussion). Following self-control exertion, activity in the amygdala 
was increased, especially for emotionally negative pictures. While the authors did not re-
port depletion-induced prefrontal activity decreases, they found that connectivity be-
tween the amygdala and the VMPFC was decreased after self-control exertion. This area 
has been implicated in emotion suppression (e.g. Urry et al., 2006), though its function is 
not without controversies (Buhle et al., 2014; Diekhof, Geier, Falkai, & Gruber, 2011).  
Sixth, Wagner et al. (2013) investigated in another fMRI study depletion effects in dieters. As in this groupǯs previous study, participant first watched a film while they either 
had to inhibit reading words (depletion condition), which appeared randomly on screen, 
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or could decide freely to read them or not (control condition). Subsequently participants 
saw pictures of highly liked and craved food items, mixed with control items. Participants 
had to indicate whether the picture showed an indoor or outdoor scene. While viewing 
food items, depleted participants activated the left orbitofrontal cortex more strongly 
than control participants. The area is considered to encode the emotional valence or sub-
jective reward of stimuli (Demos, Heatherton, & Kelley, 2012; Ochsner, Silvers, & Buhle, 
2012; Van Der Laan, De Ridder, Viergever, & Smeets, 2011). The ventral striatum/nucleus 
accumbens, although an a priori ROI, showed no significant difference between the con-
ditions. Yet depletion led to reduced connectivity between the IFG bilaterally and the OFC, 
and between the IFG bilaterally and the ventral striatum. A critical remark about their 
statistical procedure must be added. In a first step, they identified ROIs by comparing food 
versus control trials with a cluster-level threshold of p < .05. In a second step, they per-
formed t-tests for effects of depletion on activity extracted from these ROIs. For areas in-
volved in representing the emotional value of food, i.e. the OFC and ventral striatum, an 
uncorrected threshold of p < .05 was employed. This procedure is almost identical to look-
ing at fMRI results at p < .05, uncorrected, which is unusual because of a high probability 
of false-positives. The effect in the left OFC reached significance under these circum-
stances, but was not very strong, t(29) = 2.20, p = .036 (uncorrected). This raises ques-
tions about the reliability of their findings.  
Seventh and last, Wang, Yang, and Wang (2014) examined how different emotion 
regulation strategies relate to self-control exertion. This EEG study built upon the findings 
from Inzlicht and Gutsell (2007), which reported a decreased error-related negativity 
(ERN) after emotion suppression. Participants watched a sad movie and were instructed 
to suppress their internal and facial reactions (emotion suppression group), adopt a neu-
tral and objective attitude towards the movie (reappraisal group), or watch it carefully 
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(control condition group). EEG was recorded during a subsequent Stroop task. The reap-
praisal group, but not the emotion suppression group, indicated to have successfully re-
duced their sad emotions, relative to the control group. Compared to the control and the 
reappraisal group, participants who suppressed their emotional response committed 
more errors in the Stroop task. The suppression group also had a weaker ERN after errors 
than the other two groups. Later components of the event-related potential (ERP), such 
as the post-error positivity or the N450, showed no significant effects. Taken together, 
only emotion suppression seems to induce self-control exertion. Reappraisal is not only a 
more effective, the dual-task paradigm confirms it is also less effortful than suppression.  
In summary, there is a rising interest in examining the neural underpinnings of 
self-control exertion. While two EEG studes have reported depletion-induced changes in 
error monitoring (Wang et al., 2014), only one fMRI study found corresponding activity 
reductions in the ACC (Persson et al., 2013). All fMRI studies instead reported depletion-
induced changes in prefrontal functioning, either related to activity, or connectivity. Fur-
thermore, there is first neuroscientific evidence for increased emotions and desires after 
depletion, probably due to decreased influence from regulatory areas (Wagner et al., 
2013; Wagner & Heatherton, 2013).  
 
 
1.6 Emotion regulation 
Emotion regulation refers to processes which influence which emotions we have, 
when we have them, and how we experience and express them (Gross, 2002). Similar to 
other domains of self-control, emotion regulation is a means to override the innate ten-
dency how to react to a given situation. In fact, emotion regulation is frequently used to 
induce states of depletion (e.g. Friese et al., 2013; Muraven et al., 1998; Wagner & 
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Heatherton, 2013). This chapter will provide an overview of emotion regulation strate-
gies, and brain areas critical for generating and regulating emotions.  
There is a potentially limitless number of emotion regulation strategies. The highly 
influential process model of emotion regulation (which has nothing to do with the process 
model of self-control) groups emotion regulation strategies into families based on a stim-
ulus-organism-response time line (Gross, 2002). Emotion regulation families differ in 
when they have their primary impact on the emotion-generative process, as detailed in 
Fig. 2. First, situation selection refers to approaching or avoiding situation which are likely 
to cause desirable or undesirable emotions. For example, you may choose not to go near 
a person you do not like. Second, individuals may modify a situation. For example, if youǯre 
newly divorced and are asked about your partner, you may choose not to talk about it. 
Third, instead of changing a situation, individuals may direct their attention in order to 
influence their emotions. For example, if you are watching a horror movie where some 
scenes are too intense, you may distract yourself by counting the people watching the film. 
Fourth, individuals may make a cognitive effort to change how a situation is appraised. 
Reappraisal in particular involves changing the way we think about an emotional stimulus 
in order to alter its emotional impact. For example, when watching a horror movie, you 
may tell yourself that persons in the film are actors and nobody got hurt. Fifth and finally, 
response modulation refers to alter physiological, experiential, or behavioral effects as 
directly as possible after an emotion has already been elicited. This often involves sup-
pressing facial reactions. For example, you may wish to hide your shame about not watch-
ing the whole horror movie from your friends (Gross & Thompson, 2007; Gross, 2002). 
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Fig. 2. The process model of emotion regulation which highlights five families of 
emotion regulation strategies. The rectangle represents the ǲblack boxǳ, i.e. what is hap-
pening inside the person. The feedback arrow indicates that an emotional response often 
changes the situation that gave rise to the response in the first place. Retrieved from ǲEmotion regulation: Conceptual foundationsǳ by J. J. Gross & R. A. Thompson, ʹͲͲ͹, p. ͳͲ, 
in J. J. Gross (Ed.), Handbook of Emotion Regulation (pp. 3–24), New York, NY: Guilford 
Press. 
 
Several brain areas are involved in emotion generation (Ochsner et al., 2012). The 
amygdala is implicated in encoding all emotionally relevant stimuli. It reacts strongly to 
arousing stimuli and is very sensitive to potential threat cues, such as expressions of fear. 
The ventral striatum/nucleus accumbens is involved in learning which cues predict re-
ward or reinforcement. The ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), sometimes used 
synonymously with the orbitofrontal cortex, evaluates input from the amygdala and ven-
tral striatum as well as various other regions such as the temporal lobe (memory) or pre-
frontal cortex (cognitive control) with respect to current goals. The VMPFC is thought to 
be important for decision making. Finally, the anterior insula is implicated in bodily sen-
sations which can have a strong affective component (e.g. disgust), and in negative affec-
tive experience in general.  
Four meta-analyses on the neural correlates of emotion regulation have been con-
ducted in the last years (Buhle et al., 2014; Diekhof et al., 2011; Frank et al., 2014; Kohn 
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et al., 2014). While these analyses differed in the number of studies included and in the 
criteria for study selection, these differences seemed to have negligible effects on the re-
sults. In concert, they found that decrease in amygdala activity was the primary or only 
effect of successful emotion regulation. Activity increases were consistently reported in 
the IFG and middle frontal gyrus (MFG) bilaterally, ACC, and left middle temporal cortex. 
In addition, some of the meta-analyses reported uni- or bilateral clusters in the superior 
frontal gyrus (Buhle et al., 2014; Diekhof et al., 2011; Frank et al., 2014), the pre-SMA and 
SMA (Frank et al., 2014; Kohn et al., 2014), the medial frontal gyrus (Buhle et al., 2014; 
Diekhof et al., 2011), and parts of the parietal cortex (Buhle et al., 2014; Kohn et al., 2014). 
Parts of areas involved in emotion generation have also been found to increase activity 
when regulating emotions, namely the VMPF (Diekhof et al., 2011) and the anterior insula 
(Diekhof et al., 2011; Kohn et al., 2014).  
Instead of areas specific to emotion regulation, it seems that prefrontal and cingu-
late systems that support cognitive control are also main hubs for emotion regulation. The 
DLPFC, that is the middle and superior frontal gyrus, may direct attention to features of 
stimuli relevant for the regulatory process. It may even support manipulation of appraisal 
in working memory (Buhle et al., 2014). The ACC may monitor the extent to which the 
regulatory process changes the emotional response in the intended way. The IFG may in-
hibit processing of features which would strengthen the emotional response in the unde-
sired way. Different from other prefrontal structures, the IFG has direct anatomical 
connections with the amygdala (Kohn et al., 2014). On the one hand, a lot of literature on 
emotion regulation has addressed the IFG (or VLPFC) as a core regulatory center. On the 
other hand, similar to the debate of the )FGǯs role in cognitive control, the precise contri-
bution of the IFG to emotion regulation has been questioned. Specifically, Kohn et al. 
(2014) argue that the IFG may rather be involved in the perception of emotions and signal 
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the need to regulate to other brain areas. Buhle et al. (2014) offered a potential explana-
tion for the consistent additional involvement of the left middle temporal cortex. They 
suggested that prefrontal and parietal control areas influence the lateral temporal areas, 
which are associated with semantic and perceptual representations. Consistently, it has 
been suggested that reappraisal works by altering the semantic and perceptual represen-
tations of stimuli in such ways that change their emotional significance. For example, 
when watching a horror movie, you may tell yourself that ǲitǯs just a movie, not realǳ.  
Diekhof et al. (2011) presented slightly different findings and a different interpre-
tation. They found overlapping activity in the VMPFC, and a predominant role in control-
ling negative affect by cognitive emotion regulation strategies such as reappraisal. This 
assumption is supported by the finding that anatomical connections between lateral pre-
frontal regions and the amygdala are relatively sparse, but there are many connections 
from lateral prefrontal areas to the VMPFC, and from the VMPFC to the amygdala. Thus 
the VMPFC could take a mediating role between regulating and emotion-inducing areas. 
However, the other meta-analyses did not support this view since they failed to find ac-
tivity in the VMPFC (Buhle et al., 2014; Frank et al., 2014; Kohn et al., 2014). 
 
 
1.7 Research questions 
Social-psychological research has provided evidence for depletion effects across 
various tasks. Yet very little is known about the mechanisms which underlie this effect, 
and it is an open question if self-control draws on a limited resource. The first neurosci-
entific studies on self-control exertion have emerged, but so far present a very diverse 
picture of the brain areas and mental processes influenced by self-control exertion. How-
ever, fMRI studies provide an additional, neural layer to examine depletion which has 
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could fundamentally contribute to our understanding of the causes, mechanisms, effects, 
and neurophysiological understanding of depletion effects.  
The first study relates to the ongoing debate between resource and motivational 
models to explain depletion effects. As I have outlined in the introduction, findings of re-
versing depletion effects by motivation have been interpreted both to support the 
strength model or motivational models. So far, behavioral studies have been unable to 
provide deciding evidence for one model or the other. Measuring concurrent brain activ-
ity might help to differentiate between effects of depletion and motivation on the brain, 
or, alternatively, show that they are indeed indistinguishable.  
In the second study, we examined the effects of self-control exertion on the human 
brain during a subsequent period of rest. Measuring functional connectivity in the resting 
state has been increasingly popular in recent years. This approach provides a unique op-
portunity to assess self-control exertion effects in the absence of further task engagement. 
In addition, we opted for an emotion suppression task to induce self-control exertion.  
The third study was intended to investigate links between depletion, emotional 
processing, and emotional memory formation. Several studies suggest that depletion 
strengthens emotional experiences. From memory research, it is known that emotional 
experiences are better than neutral ones. While nobody has examined this hypothesis be-
fore us, it seems reasonable to assume that individuals will remember emotional events 
better if they are experienced in a state of self-control exertion.  
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Abstract 
Emotion suppression requires costly regulatory efforts, and can lead to subsequent dec-
rements in other self-control demands. Such performance drops have become known as 
depletion effects. Yet, the neural mechanisms underlying these effects remain largely un-
clear. Resting state functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is a way to describe 
connectivity and neural functioning at rest and might reveal new insights into the neural 
underpinnings of depletion effects. In a within-subject design, participants engaged in a 
picture task twice, in which they either had to suppress their emotional responses (deple-
tion condition) or leave the emotional responses unaltered (watch condition). Rest state 
connectivity was measured before and after each task. Emotion suppression led to in-
creased connectivity during rest in areas critically involved in emotion regulation, namely 
between the inferior frontal gyrus and the middle temporal gyrus. In addition, this con-
nectivity difference correlated with subjective exhaustion. By contrast, watching emo-
tional pictures decreased connectivity between areas associated with task engagement 
and rest. These results suggest that sustained task connectivity might contribute to de-
pletion effects by rendering it more difficult for these areas to establish close connections 
to other brain areas that may be important for subsequent self-control tasks.  
Keywords:  Emotion regulation, resting state, fMRI, suppression, self-control, 
   depletion 
 
Introduction 
In everyday life, individuals make use of a variety of ways to regulate their emo-
tions, one of them being the suppression of emotional responses and their expression. 
Emotion suppression is effortful and costly (Gross, 2002; Richards, 2004), and might even 
Second study: Altered brain connectivity in the resting state fMRI after  
self-control exertion 
62 
take a toll on subsequent regulatory actions (Binder et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2014). Reg-
ulatory limits have been studied extensively in behavioral research on self-control. When 
individuals engage in regulatory actions, be it emotion suppression or other forms of self-
control, subsequent performance temporarily drops. This observation has become known 
as depletion effects (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Baumeister et al., 2007; Hagger et 
al., 2010). Yet, the causes and mechanisms behind depletion effects remain poorly under-
stood and are subject to an ongoing debate (Baumeister, 2014; Inzlicht et al., 2014; Kool 
& Botvinick, 2014; Kurzban et al., 2013). Behavioral studies have relied on measuring the 
detrimental effect of prior self-control exertion on subsequent tasks. This is a rather indi-
rect way to assess self-control exertion. Advances in functional magnetic resonance im-
aging (fMRI) have made it possible to examine brain functionality in the absence of task 
engagement, potentially providing a new perspective on self-control exertion.  
Over the last decade, a growing interest has emerged in investigating the human 
brain in the resting state (RS). Neural processing is characterized by spontaneous low-
frequency signal fluctuations, which show relatively stable signal correlations over wide 
areas of the brain and are organized into distinct functional connectivity networks (De 
Luca, Beckmann, De Stefano, Matthews, & Smith, 2006). These networks have been linked 
to the intrinsic functional architecture of the brain (Smith et al., 2009) and can be detected 
with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). One of the most prominent connec-
tivity networks is the default mode network (DMN), which encompasses midline struc-
tures such as the medial prefrontal cortex and the ventral anterior and posterior cingulate 
cortex. The DMN can reliably be measured during various mental states, and it partly per-
sists even during sleep (Fukunaga et al., 2006; Sämann et al., 2011). Despite this stability, 
DMN connectivity also varies over time and as a function of several contextual factors. For 
example, evidence suggests that DMN connectivity alterations are related to internally 
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driven cognitive processes such as self-related thoughts and mind wandering (M. D. Fox 
et al., 2005; Mason et al., 2007; Raichle & Snyder, 2007). It has also been shown that con-
nectivity strength within and between connectivity networks varies as a function of task 
engagement (M. D. Fox et al., 2005; Smith et al., 2009). Activity in the DMN is suppressed 
when participants focus attention on external stimuli, e.g. during task engagement, and 
instead connectivity in the so-called task-positive network (TPN) is increased, typically 
encompassing the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the inferior frontal gyrus, the posterior 
parietal cortex, and further task-specific areas (M. D. Fox et al., 2005).  
There is evidence that previous activities can be reflected in subsequent resting 
state connectivity. Studies have shown that increased connectivity in the TPN during pe-
riods of rest after task engagement is related to learning and memory consolidation 
(Albert, Robertson, & Miall, 2009; Stevens, Buckner, & Schacter, 2010). Others have ex-
amined the effects of effortful cognitive task processing on subsequent resting states, and 
reported varying findings (Esposito, Otto, Zijlstra, & Goebel, 2014; Evers, Klaassen, 
Rombouts, Backes, & Jolles, 2012; Pyka et al., 2009). For the DMN, either increased con-
nectivity (Esposito et al., 2014; Pyka et al., 2009) or no effect (Evers et al., 2012) was re-
ported. For the TPN, increases (Evers et al., 2012), decreases (Esposito et al., 2014) or no 
effects on connectivity (Pyka et al., 2009) have been found. Though all studies aimed at 
measuring effects of mental exhaustion in the subsequent RS, comparability of results is 
hampered by widely different study designs, which ranged from very short cognitive task 
engagement of less than a minute (Pyka et al., 2009), over sustained performance of var-
ious cognitive tasks for one and a half hours (Evers et al., 2012), to training and practice 
with a flight simulator for four hours (Esposito et al., 2014).  
The present study aimed at examining RS connectivity alterations with fMRI after 
self-control exertion. Emotion suppression was chosen as the task to induce self-control 
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exertion and task duration was chosen in accordance with self-control research on deple-
tion effects. In light of the inconsistent findings of connectivity alterations after prior task 
engagement, we opted for examining changes in both the TPN and DMN. Emotion regula-
tion and cognitive control have been shown to rely on the same prefrontal brain areas, 
including the middle and inferior frontal gyrus (Buhle et al., 2014; Kohn et al., 2014; 
Ochsner et al., 2012). The inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) is considered to be a core structure 
for self-control (Aron, 2007; Tabibnia et al., 2011) and it has been associated with deple-
tion effects in a number of self-control studies (Friese et al., 2013; Persson et al., 2013; 
Wagner et al., 2013). We decided to focus on the IFG to examine the TPN and used activity 
during the emotion suppression task to functionally localize the seed area for the RS anal-
ysis. Regarding the DMN, frequently used seed areas are the medial prefrontal cortex and 
the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC). Ventral parts of the medial prefrontal cortex have 
also been reported to be involved in emotion regulation and depletion effects, which lies 
in close proximity and is partly overlapping with medial prefrontal areas associated with 
the DMN. Thus for a better interpretability of outcomes we chose the PCC as seed area for 
the DMN.  
 
Methods 
Participants 
According to Carter and McCullough (2013), the overall depletion effect corrected 
for publication bias is medium, g = 0.48 (trim-and-fill correction method). G*Power (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) indicates that to achieve 80% power in a within-subject 
design, 29 participants are sufficient. We measured 29 participants, but had to exclude 
one due excessive movement during the scanning periods. The remaining 28 participants 
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consisted of 5 males and 23 females and were on average 24.32 years old (SD = 3.52). 
Written informed consent was obtained from all participants and they received CHF 
25/hour (approximately U.S. $26). The local ethics committee approved the study.  
Procedure 
In a within-subject design, participants engaged in two fMRI scan sessions. In one 
session, they suppressed emotions while watching neutral and negative pictures (sup-
press condition). In the other session, participants simply watched neutral and negative 
pictures (watch condition). Specifically, each scan session consisted of an anatomical scan, 
a pre RS scan, the picture task, and a post RS scan. Between the two sessions, participants 
had a break of at least 40 min, during which they could rest on a couch, listen to relaxing 
music, or read magazines. The order of the conditions (suppress, watch) was counterbal-
anced across participants. An overview of the study procedure is provided in Fig. 1. After 
scanning, participants filled out questionnaires including control questions, a manipula-
tion check, and demographic data. Participants were then debriefed and thanked. 
Manipulation Check 
Following standard procedures in the behavioral literature on depletion effects, 
participants answered four questions (7-point Likert scale) after each scan session about 
how strenuous the task was, how much concentration it demanded, how much they had 
to control themselves, and how difficult the task was. A subjective exhaustion score was 
calculated by summing all four items (Cronbachǯs α = .͸ͷȌ. As expected, the emotion sup-
pression condition was rated as more exhausting than the watch condition, suggesting 
that the manipulation of self-control exertion during the picture task was successful 
(t(27) = 7.08, p < .001).   
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Fig. 1. Study Procedure. Participants engaged in two fMRI scan sessions, once in the de-
pletion condition, once in the control or watch condition. 
 
Picture Task 
In each picture task, participants were exposed to 24 negative and 24 neutral pic-
tures, grouped to blocks of four pictures of the same valence. Each block started with a 
short instruction (6 s) to either suppress the emotions elicited by the pictures (negative 
blocks in the suppress condition) or to simply watch the pictures (negative blocks in the 
watch condition and neutral blocks in both conditions). Pictures were presented for 6 s 
each. After each picture, participants rated their arousal on a four-point Likert scale (1 = 
calm, 4 = aroused) with a response pad, and saw a short reminder of the current instruc-
tion (downward arrow for suppress, horizontal arrow for watch). Time between pictures 
was 8 s. The two sets of 48 pictures each (24 negative and 24 neutral pictures) were taken 
from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008). 
The order in which the two sets of pictures were presented was counterbalanced across 
participants and with respect to condition order.  
Prior to scanning, participants received a detailed written instruction. For the sup-
press condition, they were instructed to suppress any emotional reactions to the negative 
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pictures. They were told to try to stay calm inside and outside. They were instructed to 
imagine a protective shield from which emotions bounce off and to show no facial reac-
tions, as if keeping a poker face. Furthermore, participants were told that a camera would 
film their faces during picture viewing and that observers should not be able to tell their 
emotional reactions based on these recordings. Even though we did not have a camera in 
the scanner, none of participants subsequently expressed any doubts about the supposed 
recordings. For the watch condition, participants were instructed to leave the emotional 
reactions as natural as possible, without changing them intentionally. Task design follows 
previous depletion studies where emotion suppression was used to induce self-control 
exertion (Baumeister et al., 1998; Friese et al., 2013).  
Functional imaging 
MRI scanning was performed on a Philips Intera 3 T whole-body MR unit at the 
University Hospital of Zurich, Switzerland. Functional time series were acquired with a 
sensitivity encoded, single-shot echo-planar sequence (SENSE-sshEPI) sensitive to BOLD 
contrast (T2* fast field echo with the following acquisition parameters: TR (repetition 
time) = 2500 ms, TE (echo time) = 35 ms, FOV (field of view) = 0.22 cm, acquisition matrix 
= 80 x 80, interpolated to 128 x 128, voxel size: 2.75 x 2.75 x 3.30 mm3, no gap and SENSE 
acceleration factor R = 2.0). By using a midsagittal scout image, 40 contiguous axial slices 
were placed to the anterior–posterior commissure plane covering the entire brain.  
Data analysis 
MATLAB Release R2015a and SPM12 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk) were used to analyze 
the fMRI data. In addition, the functional connectivity toolbox CONN 15.e (Whitfield-
Gabrieli & Nieto-Castanon, 2012) was used for RS analyses. The same preprocessing steps 
in SPM12 were applied to RS and task-based fMRI data. Images were realigned to correct 
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for head movement and corrected for differences in acquisition time between slices. Par-ticipantsǯ individual Tͳ-weighted structural image was co-registered with the mean func-
tional image, segmented into gray matter, white matter, and cerebrospinal fluid tissue, 
and normalized to the standard T1 MNI template. Functional images were normalized to 
the standard MNI template using the transformation matrix from the T1 normalization 
procedure and spatially resampled to 2x2x2 mm voxels. Artifact Detection Tools (ART; 
Whitfield-Gabrieli & Nieto-Castanon, 2012) were used to identify movement or other out-
lier images in the fMRI time series based on a liberal threshold (above 99 percentile). Fi-
nally, images were spatially smoothed using an 8 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel.  
Picture task. A 128-sec-cutoff high-pass filter was added to the confound partition 
of the design matrix to account for low-frequency drifts, and a correction for intrinsic au-
tocorrelations was included in the analysis. For every subject, a GLM was set up with three 
regressors of interest (negative pictures, neutral pictures, button presses indicating 
arousal), which were convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF), 
and six movement parameters derived from realignment correction as regressors of no 
interest. If ART detected outlier images, they were deweighted in the GLM with additional 
regressors. Contrast images for each participant were obtained by subtracting neutral im-
ages from negative images. To identify areas associated with emotion suppression, group-
level t-tests were performed by comparing suppression scan sessions with watch scan 
sessions. Based on converging involvement of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) in depletion 
effects and emotion regulation, we were particularly interested in activity in this area. The 
picture task was used to localize the IFG seed for the RS analysis. To this end, a 6 mm 
sphere was drawn around the IFG peak activity (MNI coordinates 48, 44, -10) in the emo-
tion suppression contrast. 
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Resting state analysis. First, functional images were band-pass filtered (0.008 to 
0.09 Hz) and the anatomical component-based noise correction method (aCompCor; 
Behzadi, Restom, Liau, & Liu, 2007) was applied to remove physiological and movement 
confounds. Specifically, aCompCor derived principal components from white matter and 
cerebrospinal fluid masks, which were included in a general linear model together with 
movement parameters and potential additional outlier regressors from ART, to remove 
artifacts from the functional image time-series. This approach has been shown to perform 
more effectively than other approaches, such as the more common global signal regres-
sion (Behzadi et al., 2007; Chai, Castañán, Öngür, & Whitfield-Gabrieli, 2012; Muschelli et 
al., 2014). Furthermore, for aCompCor, negative correlations have been shown to be valid 
indicators of functional RS connectivity (Chai et al., 2012). Bivariate correlation analyses 
were performed between seed regions and all other voxels in the brain in order to com-
pare differences between post-suppress RS and post-watch RS. Fisherǯs z-transformation 
was applied to correlation values in order to statistically compare connectivity values be-
tween conditions. As a first seed region, the IFG ROI identified in the picture task was used 
to examine connectivity changes in the TPN. A 6 mm sphere centered on the posterior 
cingulate cortex (MNI coordinates 1, -55, 17) was used as a second seed region to examine 
connectivity changes in the DMN. To correct for multiple comparisons, family-wise error 
rate (FWE) correction was applied at the cluster level (p < .05) to voxels surviving an ini-
tial peak-level threshold (p < .001, uncorrected). In a next step, the first eigenvariate was 
extracted from regions showing connectivity changes in the post-task RS and compared 
with connectivity in the pre-task RS. On the one hand, tests for connectivity differences 
between conditions in the pre-task ǲbaselineǳ were applied. On the other hand, pre-task 
and post-task connectivity was compared to examine if differences between conditions 
stemmed from increased or decreased RS connectivity. Finally, it was examined how RS 
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connectivity and task activity was related to subjectively reported exhaustion, using cor-
relation and multiple linear regression analyses. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Activity related to emotion suppression. Surface results are projected onto a 
canonical normalized T1 image. Not depicted are subcortical areas, such as the middle 
cingulate cortex, cuneus, and the caudate nucleus.  
 
Results 
Picture task 
A comparison of the suppress condition with the watch condition showed activity 
in the middle cingulate cortex and the right angular gyrus when FWE rate correction was 
applied at the cluster level. These areas are typically involved in emotion regulation. Meta-
analyses also point to a pivotal role of the IFG in emotion regulation (Buhle et al., 2014; 
Diekhof et al., 2011; Frank et al., 2014; Kohn et al., 2014). Since we were particularly in-terested in studying the )FGǯs role in depletion effects, we opted for a more liberal thresh-
old of p < .001, uncorrected, which revealed activation in the right IFG, along with six 
further activity clusters, see Table 1 and Fig. 2. Peak coordinates of the right IFG activity 
(48 42 -12) were used as the center for an IFG seed area used in the RS analyses.  
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Table 1 
Brain areas which were more strongly activated during the emotion suppression than the 
watch condition. 
 No. of   MNI coordinates  
Region voxels BA L/R x y z Z 
Middle cingulate cortex 159 23 R 8 -30 24 4.31 
Angular gyrus 151 39 R 38 -48 30 3.91 
Middle frontal gyrus 63 46 R 24 54 24 3.82 
Cuneus 54 40 R 26 -52 34 3.72 
Inferior frontal gyrus 30 47 R 48 42 -12 3.61 
Supplementary motor area 11 6 R 18 -4 72 3.60 
Middle frontal gyrus 34 44 R 42 22 36 3.44 
Supplementary motor area 15 6 R 6 -6 66 3.44 
Caudate nucleus 34  L -12 -16 20 3.38 
Note. Based on the contrast negative versus neutral pictures, this table reports clusters 
of stronger activity during the emotion suppression condition than during the watch 
condition, thresholded at p < .001 (uncorrected) in a minimum of five adjacent voxels. 
BA, Brodmann area; R, right hemisphere; L, left hemisphere. 
 
Resting state 
Task-positive network. To examine changes in the TPN, RS connectivity with the 
right IFG seed after the emotion suppression condition was compared to after the watch 
condition. Three clusters correlated more strongly with the IFG after emotion suppres-
sion. Two clusters were in the posterior part of the left middle temporal gyrus (MTG), 
which is an area typically reported in emotion regulation studies. The third cluster was in 
the rostral part of the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) bilaterally (Table 2).  
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Table 2 
Connectivity changes in the task-positive network and the default mode network. 
 No. of   MNI coordinates  
Region voxels BA L/R x y z P(FWE) 
Stronger connectivity in the TPN (IFG seed) after emotion suppression 
Middle temporal gyrus 169 21 L -62 -40 0 .002 
Middle temporal gyrus 158 20 L -46 -22 -14 .003 
Orbitofrontal cortex 98 11 L&R -8 66 -20 .037 
Weaker connectivity in the TPN (IFG seed) after emotion suppression 
No suprathreshold clusters        
Stronger connectivity in the DMN (PCC seed) after emotion suppression 
Fusiform gyrus/inferior  
occipital cortex 
249 19 L -32 -80 -10 <.001 
Inferior occipital cortex/ 
fusiform gyrus 
192 37 R 50 -68 -14 .001 
Weaker connectivity in the DMN (PCC seed) after emotion suppression 
Brainstem 194  L&R 8 -24 -34 .001 
Note. Comparison of connectivity after the emotion suppression condition versus after 
the watch condition, thresholded at p < .05 (FWE rate corrected at the cluster level) after 
an initial peak threshold of p < .001 (uncorrected). BA, Brodmann area; R, right hemi-
sphere; L, left hemisphere. 
 
For further analyses, the two clusters in the left MTG were combined to one area, 
though the outcomes were very similar when analyses were performed on both MTG clus-
ters separately. Connectivity between these areas did not differ in the pre-task resting 
states (p > .35 for both MTG and OFC), hence the differences did not stem from incon-
sistent pre-task baselines. Next the post-task resting states were compared with the as-
sociated pre-task resting states. For the left MTG, emotion suppression led to an increase 
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in connectivity (t(27) = 2.41, p = .023), and the watch condition led to a marginally signif-
icant decrease in connectivity (t(27) = -1.94, p = .063). For the OFC, there was only a ten-
dency to increased connectivity in the emotion suppression condition (t(27) = 1.89, p = 
.070), but a significant connectivity decrease in the watch condition (t(27) = -2.23, p = 
.034). In sum, emotion suppression led to a subsequent increase in the TPN, whereas 
simply watching emotional pictures led to decreased connectivity between TPN areas as 
compared to baseline conditions. See Figure 3 for an overview of the results related to the 
TPN. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Connectivity changes in the task-positive network. The orbitofrontal cortex 
(OFC) and the left middle temporal gyrus (MTG) showed connectivity differences with the 
inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) seed between the emotion suppression condition and the 
watch condition. Results are superimposed on a canonical normalized T1 image. Error 
bars indicate standard errors of the mean.  
 
Default mode network. The same analyses as for the TPN were conducted with a 
PCC seed area. After the emotion suppression condition as compared to after the watch 
condition, connectivity with the PCC was stronger in two areas located in the left and right 
inferior occipital cortex (IOC), which included parts of the fusiform gyrus. For complete-
ness, we report that connectivity with the PCC was weaker after emotion suppression in 
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a brainstem area (see Table 2). However, we will restrict further analyses to cerebral ar-
eas. Comparison of pre-task RS revealed no differences in baseline IOC-PCC connectivity 
values bilaterally (both ps > .5). Interestingly, post-task differences seemed to be primar-
ily driven by a connectivity decrease in the watch condition (left IOC: t(27) = -3.44, p = 
.002; right IOC: t(27) = -4.03, p < .001), where the connectivity changed from a slightly 
positive to a slightly negative correlation. The connectivity increase after the emotion 
suppression condition was nonsignificant (left IOC: t(27) = 1.23, p = .23; right IOC: t(27) 
= 1.63, p = .12). See Figure 4 for an overview of the results related to the DMN. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Connectivity changes in the default mode network. The left and right inferior 
occipital cortex (IOC)/fusiform gyri showed connectivity differences with the posterior 
cingulate cortex (PCC) seed between the emotion suppression condition and the watch 
condition. Results are superimposed on a canonical normalized T1 image. Error bars in-
dicate standard errors of the mean.  
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Fig. 5. Correlations of subjective exhaustion with brain connectivity and activity. (a) 
The higher the MTG-IFG connectivity (post emotion suppression RS minus post watch 
RS), the higher was subsequently reported exhaustion (emotion suppression minus 
watch condition). (b) There was a positive, yet nonsignificant correlation between IFG 
task activity (emotion suppression minus watch condition) and subsequently reported 
exhaustion (emotion suppression minus watch condition). 
 
Relation of resting state connectivity and task activity to exhaustion 
To control for baseline levels, the subjective exhaustion score for the watch condi-
tion was subtracted from the subjective exhaustion score for the emotion suppression 
condition. Likewise, post-watch connectivity values were subtracted from post-suppres-
sion connectivity values for areas which showed condition-induced connectivity differ-
ences (Fig. 3 & 4). Subjective exhaustion differences correlated highly positively and 
significantly with connectivity differences between the left MTG and the right IFG seed, r 
= .57, p = .002 (Fig. 5a). The correlation between subjective exhaustion differences and 
activity differences in the right IFG during the picture task (emotion suppression minus 
watch condition) was also positive and marginally significant, r = .35, p = .065 (Fig. 5b). 
Next, a multiple linear regression was calculated to compare the predictive value of IFG 
task activity and MTG-IFG connectivity for subjective exhaustion. A significant regression 
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equation was found (F(2, 25) = 7.39, p = .003) with an R2 (explained variance) of .37. How-
ever, only MTG-IFG connectivity was a significant predictor of subjective exhaustion 
(standardized b = .51, t(25) = 3.13, p = .004), whereas IFG task activity was not (standard-
ized b = .24, t(25) = 1.45, p = .159). This indicates that subsequently reported exhaustion 
mainly depended on TPN connectivity after task engagement.  
 
Discussion 
Several areas associated with emotion regulation were activated during emotion 
suppression, including the right IFG. Regarding the TPN in the subsequent RS, the right 
IFG showed increased connectivity with the left MTG and the OFC after emotion suppres-
sion, whereas the control condition (simply watching emotional pictures) showed de-
creased connectivity in these networks. The DMN was not significantly affected by prior emotion suppression, yet in the watch condition, the DMNǯs extension to left and right IOC 
and fusiform gyri was significantly decreased. Increased connectivity of the left MTG with 
the right IFG might be related to effortful self-control exertion, since it was valid predictor 
of subjective exhaustion.  
The IFG bilaterally and the left MTG are among the areas most consistently associ-
ated with emotion regulation in a series of meta-analyses (Buhle et al., 2014; Diekhof et 
al., 2011; Frank et al., 2014; Kohn et al., 2014). Specifically, the posterior part of the left 
temporal cortex, which is where connectivity changes were detected in the present study, 
has been associated with encoding of semantic and perceptual representations (Buhle et 
al., 2014). The IFG is considered to be a core area necessary for successful emotion regu-
lation and self-control (Aron, Durston, et al., 2007; Hare et al., 2009; Tabibnia et al., 2011). 
Its role in emotion suppression may be to inhibit processing of perceptual features induc-
ing an emotional response or to signal the need to inhibit to other brain areas (Kohn et 
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al., 2014). Thus, connections between the IFG and MTG may be central to emotion sup-
pression and the connectivity increase found after emotion suppression relative to pre-
task baseline may reflect sustained connections between areas heavily implicated in task 
processing.  
As reported previously, the IFG has been reported to show decreased activity and 
decreased connectivity after self-control exertion (Friese et al., 2013; Persson et al., 2013; 
Wagner et al., 2013). The present findings suggest that depletion effects may arise be-
cause connectivity of the IFG with other task-related areas is at least partly sustained after 
the end of a self-control task. Thus, the IFG may have a temporarily reduced capacity to 
influence activity in other areas, which might be critical for a subsequent self-control task. 
This might explain why depletion effects especially occur when participants have to 
switch from one self-control task to another, a phenomenon which has been in lack of an 
adequate explanation so far (Kurzban et al., 2013). In line with this idea, a recent study 
found that after self-control exertion, functional connectivity during task performance be-
tween the IFG and task-relevant task-specific areas was decreased (Wagner et al., 2013). 
The notion that sustained connectivity of the IFG with task-related areas may be 
related to self-control exertion effects is further supported by the predictive value of the 
MTG-IFG connectivity for subjective exhaustion in the present study. Interestingly, MTG-
IFG connectivity changes after the task, but not IFG activity during the task, was a valid 
predictor of subjective exhaustion. On the one hand, this finding might suggest that even 
though task engagement is effortful, depletion effects are more closely related to lingering 
after-effects than to self-control exertion itself. On the other hand, it also seems likely that 
participants had a better introspective awareness during a RS than during task engage-
ment or that the effect is due to recency, as the RS was closer to the questionnaire than 
the task on a temporal scale.  
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In addition to the left MTG, also the OFC showed changes in connectivity with the 
IFG after task engagement. However, these changes did not correlate with subjective ex-
haustion and were mainly due to a decrease in connectivity after the watch condition, 
which renders these findings less likely to be related to effortful emotion suppression. 
Instead, they suggest that the control condition, i.e. watching emotional pictures, has af-
fected subsequent resting state as well. The OFC has been associated with the represen-
tation of values, such as reward, mainly in the context of decision making and adaptive 
behavior (Schoenbaum, Takahashi, Liu, & Mcdannald, 2011). Under the assumption that 
OFC-IFG connectivity changes are sustained effects from prior task engagement, one 
could speculate that the OFC was involved in evaluating the emotional pictures, and the 
relative decoupling of the OFC from the IFG in the watch condition might have occurred 
because participants were instructed not to regulate their emotional responses.  
Effects in the DMN occurred because of connectivity alteration of the PCC seed with 
the IOC bilaterally in the watch condition. The detected area of the IOC, which extended 
into the fusiform gyrus, is associated with face and emotion perception, and linking visual 
stimuli to memory (Rossion, Schiltz, & Crommelinck, 2003; Vuilleumier & Pourtois, 2007). 
In each negative picture set, 11 out of 24 pictures showed faces and 6 additional pictures 
showed humans. Hence these areas were likely involved in visual stimulus processing. RS 
coupling of the fusiform gyrus and parts of the occipital cortex to the hippocampus after 
encoding have been shown to predict memory (Tambini, Ketz, & Davachi, 2010). The areaǯs decoupling from the DMN might reflect continued memory consolidation processes 
in the watch condition, whereas emotion suppression is known to reduce memory for-
mation (Binder et al., 2012; Richards & Gross, 2006).  
Our findings of increased or sustained connectivity in central task areas are in line 
with RS studies of learning and memory consolidation (Albert et al., 2009; Stevens et al., 
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2010). One study of mental exhaustion has also reported subsequently increased TPN 
connectivity (Evers et al., 2012). Other RS studies on mental exhaustion either did not 
report TPN connectivity at all (Pyka et al., 2009) or a connectivity decrease (Esposito et 
al., 2014), yet employed a much shorter task duration (Pyka et al., 2009) or a very differ-
ent study design (Esposito et al., 2014).  Furthermore, these studies found no changes in 
the DMN after mental effort (Evers et al., 2012) or an enhancement (Esposito et al., 2014; 
Pyka et al., 2009). However, DMN enhancement effects were either too weak to survive 
correction for multiple comparisons (Esposito et al., 2014) or were detected in the ab-
sence of a pre-task RS (Pyka et al., 2009). When only analyzing the post-task RS, the pre-
sent findings could be interpreted misleadingly as an enhancement and extension of the 
DMN to additional areas. The comparison to the baseline condition (pre-task RS) revealed 
that the increase in DMN connectivity in the emotion suppression condition was small 
and nonsignificant, yet there was a significant decrease in the watch condition. Thus RS 
connectivity is not only susceptible to prior effortful task engagement, but also to control 
tasks that feature emotional stimulus material, but no regulation instructions. These find-
ings point to the importance of pre-manipulation RS assessments to be able to adequately 
interpret the data. 
A limitation of the current study is that effects of emotion suppression during the 
task were rather weak and could only be detected based on the a priori definition of an 
area of interest, which did not survive correction for multiple comparisons. Yet, subse-
quent RS still showed clear effects of prior task engagement. Furthermore, the current 
study did not measure any effects of self-control exertion on behavior. This is a problem 
inherent to the study design, which allowed to examine sustained effects of prior effort 
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(self-control exertion) directly, i.e. in the absence of task engagement. Periods of rest ham-
per depletion effects (Baumeister, 2002), thus an additional task after the RS should have 
shown no or weakened depletion effects.   
To our knowledge, this is the first study which examined effects of effortful emo-
tion regulation on subsequent RS. It could be shown that engaging in emotion regulation 
as well as the unregulated experience of emotions have various effects on the TPN and the 
DMN in a subsequent RS. A new perspective on the potential mechanisms of depletion 
effects is provided. Areas critically involved in regulation and control, such as the IFG, 
exhibit sustained connectivity with previously regulated areas, here the left MTG, which 
might temporarily reduce the flexibility of the brain to adjust to new regulatory demands. 
Future studies on self-control exertion could extend on these findings by examining func-
tional connectivity during ongoing task performance.  
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Abstract 
Self-control is critical for regulating impulsive behavior. Initial acts of self-control lead to 
impaired subsequent self-control performance. Wagner and Heatherton (2013) reported 
that acts of self-control impair prefrontal regulation of emotional reactivity, resulting in 
increased amygdala activation in response to emotional pictures. The amygdala is central 
to emotional memory formation. Here, we aimed at showing that increases in amygdala 
activation after self-control exertion lead to increased emotional memory. Fifty-two par-
ticipants watched emotional and neutral pictures before and after they did or did not ex-
ert self-control during well-established self-control tasks, while brain activity was 
recorded with functional magnetic resonance imaging. Twenty-four hours later, partici-
pants recalled pictures in a surprise recall test. In contrast to the previously reported find-
ings, exerting self-control did not increase amygdala activation in response to emotional 
pictures. Consequently, emotional memory was unaffected by self-control exertion. Inde-
pendent from the self-control manipulation, viewing of emotional pictures resulted in 
higher amygdala activity, higher arousal ratings and better recall performance as com-
pared to neutral pictures. While these results replicated findings from emotional memory 
research, exerting self-control had no influence on these variables. We conclude that in-
creased amygdala reactivity in response to emotional cues may not be a reliable conse-
quence of self-control exertion. 
Keywords: Self-control, ego depletion, emotional memory, fMRI 
 
Introduction 
Self-control is the ability to control dominant responses such as impulses, 
thoughts, emotions, and action tendencies. It is key to achieving long-term goals such as 
academic achievement, stable social relationships, and mental and physical health 
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(Duckworth, 2011; Moffitt et al., 2011). Self-control failures, by contrast, contribute to 
many societal problems, including obesity, addiction, poor financial decisions, sexual in-
fidelity, and gambling (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Heatherton & Wagner, 2011).  
The strength model of self-control postulates that any kind of self-control relies on 
a domain-independent, limited resource which becomes temporarily depleted with use 
(Baumeister, 2014; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Even though the mediating processes 
are not yet well understood (Beedie & Lane, 2012; Inzlicht et al., 2014; Inzlicht & 
Schmeichel, 2012; Job et al., 2010; Kurzban et al., 2013), ample evidence suggests that the 
initial exertion of self-control leads to impairments in subsequent tasks requiring self-
control, decision making, and executive functioning (see Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & 
Chatzisarantis, 2010, for a meta-analysis).  
Interestingly, emotion regulation apparently draws on the same underlying psy-
chological processes as does the exertion of self-control. That is, the effortful inhibition of 
emotions leads to reduced persistence (Baumeister et al., 1998), poorer intellectual per-
formance (Schmeichel, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2003), and an increased influence of impul-
sive processes on eating unhealthy food and drinking alcohol (Friese, Hofmann, & Wänke, 
2008). In addition to impairing subsequent self-control exertion, emotion regulation is 
also affected by the previous exertion of self-control in seemingly unrelated tasks: After 
thought suppression (Muraven et al., 1998), a working memory task (Schmeichel, 2007), or managing oneǯs impression in front of a skeptical audience (Vohs, Baumeister, & 
Ciarocco, 2005), the suppression of facial reactions during an emotive videotape was im-
paired.  
On the neural level, Wagner and Heatherton (2013) recently reported that activa-
tion of the amygdala was increased after exertion of self-control during viewing of nega-
tive emotional pictures. The amygdala is one of the most important regions for emotional 
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processing in the brain (LeDoux, 2007). In addition, functional connectivity between the 
left amygdala and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) was reduced as compared 
to the control group that did not engage in self-control. The VMPFC and lateral prefrontal 
brain areas are associated with the top-down regulation of emotional responses (Frank 
et al., 2014). Based on these results, the authors suggested that exerting self-control re-
duces the ability to spontaneously down-regulate emotional responses as indicated by an 
increased activation of the amygdala.  
The amygdala is not only involved in emotional processing, but activity in this 
brain region is also critical for memory of emotional experiences, probably by modulating 
processes of plasticity in adjacent temporal lobe areas including the hippocampus (LaBar 
& Cabeza, 2006; McGaugh, 2004). Emotional experiences are typically better remembered 
than neutral ones (LaBar & Cabeza, 2006), and increased amygdala activity at the time of 
encoding predicts better recall (Kensinger & Corkin, 2004; McGaugh, 2004). The memory-
facilitation effect of emotional material does not occur in persons with lesions to the 
amygdala (Cahill, Babinsky, Markowitsch, & McGaugh, 1995) and is reduced in persons 
who down-regulate their emotional responses during encoding (Binder et al., 2012).  
As self-control exertion has been shown to impair emotion regulation and increase 
amygdala reactivity (Muraven et al., 1998; Schmeichel, 2007; Vohs et al., 2005; Wagner & 
Heatherton, 2013), here we aimed at showing that prior self-control exertion improves 
emotional memory via increased amygdala activation. Participants saw a series of emo-
tional and neutral pictures before and after two tasks either requiring or not requiring 
self-control while their brain activity was recorded using functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI). The next day, participants engaged in a surprise recall task of the pictures 
they had seen. We expected stronger emotional reactivity in the amygdala after self-con-
trol exertion, especially for negative pictures (H1, see Wagner & Heatherton, 2013). Most 
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centrally, we expected better recall of emotional, especially negative pictures due to the 
increased emotional reactivity in the amygdala after self-control exertion (H2). Unexpect-
edly, no self-control exertion effects were found in the amygdala (H1), thus failing to con-ceptually replicate Wagner and (eathertonǯs (2013) findings. Consequently, there was 
also no evidence for better recall of emotional pictures (H2).  
 
Methods 
Participants 
A total of 63 healthy participants completed the study. Eleven participants had to 
be excluded from the analysis due to excessive head movements during the scanning pe-
riods (threshold > 3 mm translation or > 2 degrees rotation, n = 7) and technical problems 
with fMRI data acquisition (n = 4). The final sample consisted of 52 participants (30 fe-
male) with a mean age of 24.50 years (SD = 3.43). Participants were randomly assigned 
to either the self-control exertion (n = 26) or the control condition (n = 26). The sample 
size was chosen to be similar to the study by Wagner and Heatherton (2012, n = 24 per 
group) and follows the guidelines of Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn (2011) who rec-
ommended a minimum of 20 participants per condition. Written informed consent was 
obtained from all participants who received CHF 25/hour (approximately U.S. $25). The 
local ethics committee approved the study.  
 
Procedure 
First, participants briefly practiced all tasks outside of the fMRI scanner. Next, they 
were positioned in the scanner and their head was secured in the coil. During scanning, 
they first engaged in a task where they watched pictures of positive, neutral, and negative 
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emotional valence. Next, they performed two self-control manipulation tasks that either 
required or did not require self-control (i.e. work on congruent vs. incongruent trials in a 
Stroop task, engage in free thought vs. thought suppression). Then they completed a sec-
ond picture task with a different picture set. Figure 1 provides an overview of the fMRI 
session. Finally, participants filled out questionnaires including a manipulation check and 
demographic data. Participants returned 24 hours later for an unexpected free recall test 
of the pictures. After that, participants were debriefed and thanked. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Overview of the fMRI session. The first picture task served as a baseline meas-
urement for emotional reactivity. Participants then either engaged in two depleting self-
control tasks (Stroop, thought suppression) or two control tasks. Finally they completed 
another picture viewing task with a different set of pictures. The order of the two picture 
sets was counterbalanced between participants. 24 hours later, participants had to 
shortly describe each picture in a surprise free recall test.  
 
Tasks 
Picture task. Participants viewed a series of emotionally negative, neutral, and pos-
itive pictures (24 per valence category) and rated their arousal after each. Two sets of 72 
pictures were chosen from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008). The order of the sets was counterbalanced across participants 
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and the order of the pictures within a set was pseudorandomized. Additionally, two neu-
tral pictures were shown at the beginning and at the end of both picture tasks. These pic-
tures were discarded from analyses to control for primacy and recency effects on 
memory. Each trial consisted of a jitter (0 – 2.5 s), a fixation cross (0.5 s), presentation of 
a picture (2 s), blank screen (1 s), presentation of a 4-point Likert scale to rate arousal 
(max. 2.5 s) and a display of their response (0.5 s). At the end of a trial, three dots appeared 
in the center of the screen for a variable amount of time (M = 4.72 s, SD = 1.09 s, range 
1.37 to 8.02 s). This short break served to measure baseline activity. Task duration was 
approximately 12.5 min. 
Stroop task. The task consisted of colored and white trial blocks. Before each block, three Xǯs ȋXXXȌ in either colored or white letters cued what block type followed. )n colored 
blocks, color words appeared in the center of the screen written in blue, red, or yellow 
letters. Participants were instructed to indicate the color of the letters by button press 
and ignore the semantic meaning of the word. In the self-control exertion condition, all 
trials were incongruent such that the semantic meaning of the word and color of the let-
ters did not match. One quarter of the trials consisted of underlined words. In these cases, 
participants had to respond to the semantic meaning of the word instead of the color of 
the letters. Underlined words served to make the self-control exertion more demanding 
and to prevent participants from developing strategies to make the task easier (e.g., blur-
ring vision). In the control condition, all colored trials were congruent (i.e., the color of 
the letters matched the semantic meaning of the word). In white blocks, trials consisted 
of the words blue, red, and yellow written in white letters. Participants had to indicate the 
semantic meaning of each word. White trials were used to measure baseline activity. In 
all trials, stimuli remained on screen until a button was pressed or until 1500 ms had 
passed. The duration of a following fixation cross was adjusted such that each trial was 
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2200 ms long (response time after stimulus presentation plus fixation cross). Each block 
consisted of 12 trials. There were 20 blocks in total, 15 of which employed colored trials, 
and 5 employed white trials. Task duration was approximately 9 min.  
Thought-suppression task. The second task to manipulate self-control exertion was 
a thought-suppression task (Mitchell et al., 2007; Wegner, 1989). In the self-control exer-
tion condition, participants were shown a red light at the beginning of each block, which 
signaled that they had to suppress any thoughts about a white bear during the following 
block. The traffic light was presented for 2 s and was followed by a black screen of 30 s 
duration. In the control condition, participants were shown a green traffic light and in-
structed to think freely of anything, including a white bear. At the end of each block, a 
fixation cross appeared for a variable amount of time (11 - 20 s), during which all partic-
ipants were instructed to think freely of anything they wanted. The task consisted of 10 
blocks and lasted for approximately 8 min. 
Free recall task. Participants had to describe from memory as many of the pictures 
as possible that they had seen during the fMRI session the previous day. They were asked 
to indicate for each picture whether it had been presented in the first or second picture 
task. None of the participants indicated that she or he suspected a recall task for the sec-
ond day.  
Manipulation check 
Participants answered three questions relating to the Stroop and the thought sup-
pression/free thought task, asking how exhausting and how difficult they found the task, 
and how much concentration it demanded. An effort mean score was calculated over all six items ȋCronbachǯs α = 0.73).  
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Functional imaging 
MRI scanning was performed on a Philips Intera 3 T wholebody MR unit equipped 
with an eight-channel Philips SENSE head coil at the University Hospital of Zurich, Swit-
zerland. Functional time series were acquired with a sensitivity encoded, single-shot 
echo-planar sequence (SENSE-sshEPI) sensitive to BOLD contrast (T2* fast field echo with 
the following acquisition parameters: TR (repetition time) = 2500 ms, TE (echo time) = 
35 ms, FOV (field of view) = 220 mm, acquisition matrix = 80 x 80, interpolated to 128 x 
128, voxel size: 3.3 x 3.3 x 3.3 mm3, no gap and SENSE acceleration factor R = 2). By using 
a midsagittal scout image, 40 contiguous axial slices were placed to the anterior–posterior 
commissure plane covering the entire brain. The picture tasks consisted of approximately 
300 functional scans each. Participants viewed stimuli through a mirror mounted on top 
of the head coil.  
Data analysis 
Repeated-measures ANOVAs with the within-subjects factors picture valence 
(negative, neutral, positive) and time (1st set, 2nd set) and the between-subjects factor self-
control condition (self-control exertion, control) were used to test for effects of the exper-
imental manipulation. This analysis was applied to arousal ratings, recall performance, 
and brain data.  
MATLAB Release 2012b and SPM8 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk) were used for fMRI data 
analysis. Functional images were corrected for differences in acquisition time between slices and realigned to correct for head movement. Participantsǯ individual T1-weighted 
structural image was co-registered with the mean functional image and normalized to the 
standard T1 MNI template using the new-segmentation-procedure. Functional images 
were normalized to the standard MNI template using the same transformation and spa-
tially resampled to 2x2x2mm voxels. Finally, images were spatially smoothed using an 
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8mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. A 128-s-cutoff high-pass filter was added to the confound 
partition of the design matrix to account for low-frequency drifts, and a correction for 
intrinsic autocorrelations was included in the analysis. 
For the analysis of the self-control manipulation tasks, two additional participants 
had to be excluded because of too much movement during these tasks only. A General 
Linear Model (GLM) was set up for both tasks combined. Stroop parameters included cor-
rect color trials (self-control exertion condition: incongruent and underlined trials, con-
trol condition: congruent trials), correct white trials, incorrect trials, and button presses. 
Parameters from the thought-suppression task included task blocks (thought suppression 
vs. free thought) and fixation blocks. In addition, six movement parameters derived from 
realignment correction served as regressors of no interest. The contrasts color trials ver-
sus white trials (Stroop task) and task blocks versus fixation blocks (thought-suppression 
task) were used for group analyses. Differences between the self-control exertion and the 
control condition were examined using t-tests, with a specific focus on the inferior frontal 
gyrus, which is critically involved in self-control and inhibition (Aron et al., 2004; Tabibnia 
et al., 2011). A sphere of 6 mm around peak coordinates of differences for each task was 
used to extract activity from the inferior frontal gyrus and compare it with the effort mean 
score.  
For each of the two picture tasks, a GLM was set up with regressors of the onsets 
of negative, neutral, and positive pictures, baseline periods, button presses, and move-
ment parameters. Three contrast images were calculated comparing negative, neutral, 
and positive picture presentations to baseline periods and analyzed differences between 
conditions on the group level using ANOVAs. A fourth contrast compared emotional (neg-
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ative and positive) pictures to neutral ones. Based on a priori hypotheses, we were par-
ticularly interested in the amygdala because of its central function in emotional pro-
cessing (Phelps, 2006). 
In addition, differences in functional connectivity between conditions were inves-
tigated using a generalized form of psychophysiological interaction (gPPI) analysis 
(McLaren, Ries, Xu, & Johnson, 2012). In contrast to standard PPI, gPPI allows to incorpo-
rate psychophysiological interaction regressors for all conditions into one model. Analo-
gously to Wagner and Heatherton (2013), a six millimeter sphere in the left amygdala 
(center coordinates in MNI space: -21, -6, -21) was used as seed to extract the first eigen-
variate time-series. A second time-series was extracted from the right amygdala (6 mm 
sphere centered on 22 -2 18). Psychophysiological interaction regressors for negative, 
neutral, and positive pictures and baseline periods were then included in two GLMs for 
the left and right amygdala together with the respective psychological regressors, the 
original time-series and nuisance regressors. Contrasts for negative, neutral, and positive 
pictures versus baseline periods were submitted to group analyses. 
Another GLM was set up to test effects of successful memory encoding. Regressors 
were correctly recalled pictures (M = 23.52, SD = 9.93, range = 5 - 49), forgotten pictures, 
button presses, baseline periods, and movement parameters. Contrast images of recalled 
versus forgotten pictures were subjected to the group analysis. To test specifically for ef-
fects of emotional memory, an additional regression analysis was conducted. The differ-
ence between the amount of recalled emotional versus neutral pictures was used as a 
regressor to predict brain activity in the contrast images emotional versus neutral pic-
tures from the first GLM. In all memory-related analyses, the hippocampus was an a priori 
area of interest in addition to the amygdala. WFU pickatlas was used to define these areas 
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anatomically (Maldjian et al., 2004; Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002). Small-volume-correc-
tions (SVC) was applied at a threshold of p < 0.05 (corrected for the volume of interest), 
building on an initial threshold of p < .001 (uncorrected) for the whole brain. Anatomical 
labels were assigned with the AAL toolbox (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002).  
 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
As expected, participants in the self-control exertion condition (M = 4.14, SD = 
1.06) found the self-control tasks more exhausting, more difficult, and demanding more 
concentration than participants in the control condition (M = 3.26, SD = 1.07), t(50) = 2.97, 
p = .005.  
In addition to these self-reports, brain activity during the tasks was checked for 
differences due the self-control manipulation (i.e. Stroop task, thought-suppression task). 
In both tasks, brain areas related to effortful self-control were more activated in the self-
control exertion condition than in the control condition: Comparison of the self-control 
exertion condition and the control condition in the Stroop task revealed stronger activity 
in prefrontal areas, the basal ganglia, and other areas commonly activated in this task (see 
Supplementary Table S1 for detailed information). The thought-suppression condition 
led to stronger activity than the control condition in prefrontal areas, the cingulate cortex, 
and the basal ganglia (see Supplementary Table S2). The left inferior frontal gyrus, a re-
gion commonly implicated in the exertion of top-down control, was more activated in the 
self-control exertion condition than in the control condition in both tasks. In addition, the 
averaged activity in the inferior frontal gyrus of both tasks correlated significantly with 
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the behavioral effort mean score (r = .34, p = .015). Together with the results on self-re-
ported effort, these data suggest that our self-control exertion manipulation was success-
ful.  
 
 
Fig. 2. No self-control exertion effect on emotional arousal ratings, amygdala activ-
ity and memory for pictures. The graphs show the change scores of the second picture 
viewing task minus the first picture viewing task (baseline) for arousal ratings (a), amyg-
dala activity (b), and free recall (c). Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.  
 
Arousal ratings 
As expected, arousal ratings of the pictures differed between the three emotional 
categories (negative, neutral, positive,). A repeated-measures ANOVA with the within-
subjects factors emotional valence and time and the between-subjects factor self-control 
condition only showed a significant main effect of picture valence (F(2, 100) = 336.66, p 
< .001). Negative pictures received the highest arousal ratings (M = 2.98, SD = 0.58), as 
compared to positive (M = 2.16, SD = 0.60, p < .001) and neutral pictures (M = 1.46, SD = 
0.46, p < .001), while neutral pictures received the lowest (compared to positive and neu-
tral pictures, both ps < .001; see Fig. 2a). There was a tendency to lower arousal ratings 
for the later picture set (F(1, 50) = 3.29, p = .076) possibly reflecting adaption processes. 
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The main effect of self-control condition (F(1, 50) = 0.04, p = .845) and the interactions of 
self-control condition and time (F(1, 50) = 1.03, p = .315) or self-control condition, time, 
and valence were non-significant (F(2, 100) = 0.20, p = .820).  
Picture task 
Emotional valence. An overall repeated-measures ANOVA of both picture tasks re-
vealed a main effect of emotional valence in a widespread network including brain areas 
involved in processing of emotions (e.g. the amygdala) and emotion regulation (e.g., infe-
rior frontal gyrus; Table 1). Anatomically defined ROIs were used to extract activity from 
the amygdala (Fig. 3a). As expected, the activity pattern mirrored that of the arousal rat-
ings (Fig. 3b). Activity in the left amygdala was highest for negative pictures (M = 0.35, SD 
= 0.55), lowest for neutral (M = -0.02, SD = 0.48), and intermediate for positive pictures 
(M = 0.11, SD = 0.53). Differences between valences were highly significant (all ps < .001), 
replicating well-known findings (Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002; Rasch et al., 
2009). In line with Wagner and Heatherton (2013), we focus on the left hemisphere for 
result reporting, but found a very similar pattern of results in the right hemisphere.  
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Table 1  
Brain areas showing a main effect of emotional valence. 
 No. of   MNI coordinates  
Region voxels BA L/R x y z Z 
Middle temporal gyrus 6012 37 R 52 -68 4 Inf 
Fusiform gyrus 9640 37 L -40 -50 -18 Inf 
Thalamus1 2891  L -2 -30 -2 Inf 
Insula2 1321  L -40 18 -8 Inf 
Inferior frontal gyrus PTR 1907 45 R 52 26 -2 Inf 
Rolandic operculum 300 48 R 38 -18 18 7.50 
Postcentral gyrus 1494 3 L -42 -30 60 7.20 
Middle frontal gyrus3  297 46 L -40 50 -2 7.02 
Superior temporal gyrus 256 22 R 60 -12 4 6.51 
Precentral gyrus 263 4 R 38 -20 50 6.29 
Superior temporal gyrus 179 41 L -46 -32 12 6.19 
Angular gyrus 52 39 R 46 -62 38 5.89 
Anterior cingulate cortex 87 10 L -4 54 -2 5.83 
Inferior frontal gyrus TPR 21 45 L -46 28 30 5.71 
Inferior parietal gyrus 26 3 L -52 -24 40 5.27 
Note. List of brain areas showing a main effect of emotional valence based on an F-con-
trast, thresholded at p < .05 (FWE corrected for the whole brain) in a minimum of 20 ad-
jacent voxels. 1This cluster incorporates amygdala and hippocampus, both bilaterally. 
252% of this cluster lie in the left inferior frontal gyrus. 347% of this cluster lie in the left 
inferior frontal gyrus. BA, Brodmann area; R, right hemisphere; L, left hemisphere, PTR, 
triangular part. 
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Fig. 3. Effects of emotional valence on amygdala activity. (a) Frontal brain view de-
picting the bilateral amygdala ROI, negative and positive pictures relative to baseline ac-
tivation (in this order of superposition), thresholded at p < .001 (uncorrected). Activation 
is superimposed on a canonical normalized image. (b) Mean activation extracted from the 
left amygdala ROI elicited by negative, neutral and positive pictures, relative to baseline 
activation. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.  
 
Effects of self-control exertion. To test for effects of self-control exertion, interac-
tions between self-control condition, time, and emotional valence were examined in a re-
peated-measures ANOVA. No significant interaction was observed when family-wise 
error correction was applied for the whole brain. The analysis was repeated for the amyg-
dala ROI. Different from Wagner and Heatherton (2013) and against our expectations 
(H1), no significant differences were detected in the amygdala (F(2, 100) = 0.08, p = .928, 
Fig. 2b). Thus, in the present study, self-control exertion had no effect on emotional reac-
tivity, as indicated by amygdala activity. In an exploratory analysis of the whole brain, the 
VMPFC (Fig. 4a) and the anterior cingulate cortex showed interaction effects at a lower 
threshold of p < .001 (uncorrected; see Table 2 for details). When comparing negative 
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versus neutral pictures, the effect was strongest for the VMPFC, which is implicated in 
emotion regulation (Johnstone, van Reekum, Urry, Kalin, & Davidson, 2007; Ochsner et 
al., 2012; Urry et al., 2006). Activity in the VMPFC decreased after the self-control exertion 
tasks, while it increased slightly after the control tasks (Fig. 4b). Interestingly, Wagner & 
Heatherton (2013) did not report reduced activity of the VMPFC, but a reduced connec-
tivity between this area and the amygdala after self-control exertion for negative pictures. 
For positive vs. neutral pictures in the present study, the effect was reversed in the medial 
frontal gyrus and anterior cingulate cortex (see Table 2).  
 
 
Fig. 4. Self-control exertion effects in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC). 
(a) Sagittal view of the VMPFC cluster with color-coded T-values, thresholded at p < .001 
(uncorrected), superimposed on a canonical normalized image. (b) The extracted cluster 
from the VMPFC (cluster size k =20) shows the expected effect of self-control exertion: 
After the self-control exertion tasks, activity decreased. After the control tasks, activity 
increased slightly, potentially reflecting adaptation processes to task demands.  
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Table 2 
Brain areas showing an interaction effect of time, self-control condition, and emotional va-
lence. 
 No. of   MNI coordinates  
Region voxels BA L/R x y z Z 
Negative versus neutral: Reduced activation after self-control exertion 
Medial frontal gyrus1 20  L -12 60 4 4.36 
Putamen 43  R 30 -16 2 4.17 
Lobule IV, V of vermis 20  L -6 -54 -26 4.04 
        
Negative versus neutral: Interaction of time and condition testing for activa-
tion 
No suprathreshold clusters 
        
Positive versus neutral: Interaction of time and condition testing for deactiva-
tion 
No suprathreshold clusters 
        
Positive versus neutral: Increased activation after self-control exertion 
Anterior cingulate cortex  44  L -10 4 30 4.35 
Anterior cingulate cortex  32  L -12 26 18 4.16 
Medial frontal gyrus 54   0 48 34 4.01 
Medial frontal gyrus 29  L -6 30 52 3.56 
Note. List of brain areas showing interaction effects, thresholded at p < .001 (uncorrected) 
in a minimum of 20 adjacent voxels. No activation survived whole-brain correction. 1The 
medial frontal gyrus forms part of the VMPFC. BA, Brodmann area; R, right hemisphere; 
L, left hemisphere. 
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For the connectivity analysis using the gPPI approach with the amygdala seeds, 
interactions between self-control condition, time, and emotional valence were again com-
puted. In contrast to Wagner and Heatherton (2013), no connectivity changes for either 
the left or right amygdala were found that lay within the VMPFC or that survived correc-
tion for multiple comparisons. 
Memory 
Recall performance. Emotional valence had a significant impact on memory perfor-
mance in the surprise free recall test on the next day (F(2,100) = 38.60, p < .001). Negative 
(M = 4.10, SD = 1.14) and positive pictures (M = 5.05, SD = 1.27) were better remembered 
than neutral ones (M = 2.62, SD = 1.02, both ps < .001), replicating the well-known modu-
lating effect of emotion on memory (see McGaugh, 2000). In contrast to our hypothesis 
(H2), but logically following the null-effect of self-control exertion on amygdala reactivity, 
self-control exertion had also no effect on recall performance (Fig. 2c). Neither the three-
way interaction between time, emotional valence, and self-control condition (F(2, 100) = 
0.21, p = .812) nor the two-way interaction between time and self-control condition was 
significant (F(2, 100) = 0.26, p = .615). Thus, the current study is unable to provide evi-
dence for a self-control exertion effect on memory formation.  
Effects of neural activity on memory. Since self-control exertion did not affect 
memory, it comes as no surprise that brain activity related to successful memory encod-
ing did not show any changes after self-control exertion. Next the two experimental 
groups and the two picture sets were combined to investigate brain activity predicting 
recall. Recalled pictures as compared to forgotten ones elicited stronger activity bilater-
ally in the hippocampus (left: [-18 -4 -20], Z = 4.80, p(SVC) = .001; right: [16 -4 -16], Z = 
4.80, p(SVC) = .001, see Figure 5a) and the amygdala (left: [-18 -4 -18], Z = 4.77, p(SVC) < 
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.001; right: [18 -2 -16], Z = 4.64, p(SVC) < .001). Further areas are reported in Supplemen-
tary Table S3. A regression analysis revealed that the left hippocampus contributed to the 
emotional memory effect ([-30 -22 -16], Z = 3.90, p(SVC) = .017, see Figure 5b and c). 
These results confirm relationships well-known from extant literature: Successful 
memory encoding critically depended on the hippocampus and the amygdala (McGaugh, 
2004; Squire, 1992).  
 
 
Fig. 5. Effects of memory on neural activity. (a) Areas in the hippocampus and the 
amygdala which were more strongly activated during correctly recalled as compared to 
forgotten pictures (subsequent memory effect). (b) Regression analysis revealed that 
higher activity in the left amygdala predicted higher emotional memory performance (i.e., 
number of correctly remembered emotional minus neutral pictures) tested 24 h later. For 
illustration purposes, T-values are color-coded at a threshold of p < .005 (uncorrected) 
and activations are superimposed on a canonical normalized T1 image. (c) The scatter 
plot shows the activity in the left hippocampus cluster which predicts emotional memory 
performance tested 24 hours later.  
 
Discussion 
The current study examined self-control exertion effects on emotional memory. 
We assumed that emotional pictures would be remembered better after self-control ex-
ertion as a consequence of the heightened amygdala activity during encoding. Behavioral, 
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neural, and memory-related data revealed expected and typical effects of emotional va-
lence. The self-control exertion tasks were rated as more effortful than the control tasks 
and heightened activity was found in prefrontal control areas during the self-control ex-
ertion tasks as compared to the control tasks, as expected. These findings suggest that our 
experimental manipulations and procedures were successfully implemented. However, 
in contrast to previous reports, self-control exertion did not affect amygdala reactivity 
and memory performance.  
Replication is key for testing the reliability of effects and establishing trustworthy 
empirical results (Funder et al., 2014; J. P. a. Ioannidis, 2012; Simons, 2014). The replica-
bility of self-control exertion effects has recently been questioned, and it has been argued 
that the medium-to-large effect sizes related to self-control exertion (Hagger et al., 2010) 
may partly arise from publication bias (Carter & McCullough, 2014). This notion under-
lines the need to conduct replication studies on self-control exertion effects. The current 
study included a conceptual replication of a self-control exertion effect on emotional pro-
cessing. It is most directly related to an fMRI study from Wagner and Heatherton (2013). 
This study had shown increased activity in the left amygdala after self-control exertion. 
However, rather than an exact replication, the current study was designed to conceptually replicate and extend these findings. )t thus differs from Wagner and (eathertonǯs work 
(2013) in several ways: 
 First, to manipulate self-control exertion Wagner and Heatherton (2013) used an 
attention control task where participants had to inhibit reading words which appeared 
on screen during a film while we used a thought suppression task and a Stroop task. Both 
the thought-suppression task (Fischer, Greitemeyer, & Frey, 2008; Friese, Schweizer, 
Arnoux, Sutter, & Wänke, 2014; Muraven et al., 1998) and the Stroop task (Bray, Martin 
Ginis, Hicks, & Woodgate, 2008; Job et al., in press; Vohs et al., 2005) used here have been 
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shown to induce self-control exertion effects previously (see also Hagger et al., 2010). 
Second, two self-control tasks were used instead of one, because research suggests that a 
series of different tasks leads to particularly strong self-control exertion effects (Vohs et 
al., 2013). Third, participants rated their arousal after each picture in our study, whereas in Wagner and (eathertonǯs study ȋʹͲͳ͵Ȍ, participants made unrelated ǲindoor or out-doorǳ judgements. )t is conceivable that reflecting on emotional arousal while being ex-
posed to the pictures made all participants focus on emotional processing to the same 
degree, potentially interfering with differences caused by previous self-control exertion. 
However, we have used the same task in previous research without any indication that it 
may have interfered with the advantage of emotional over neutral pictures in memory 
formation (Rasch et al., 2009). Other researchers have also employed arousal ratings of 
IAPS pictures and reported corresponding changes in amygdala activity (e.g. Canli, Zhao, 
Brewer, Gabrieli, & Cahill, 2000). In sum, while there are some differences in the study 
designs, we consider these unlikely to have precluded potential self-control exertion ef-
fects on emotional processing.  
One aspect of the study where we followed Wagner and Heatherton (2013) is that 
participants were not instructed to regulate their emotional responses. It was assumed 
that they would engage in spontaneous emotion regulation upon seeing pictures of emo-
tional valence. A limitation of this approach is that it is unclear to what degree participants 
actually did so and which emotion regulation strategies they used. Many brain imaging studies about emotion regulation have focused on ǲreappraisalǳ and reported activity in-
creases in lateral prefrontal areas (Ochsner et al., 2012). (owever, regulating oneǯs emo-
tions by reappraisal apparently does not depend on effortful self-control, whereas 
voluntary emotion suppression does (Wang et al., 2014). The latter emotion regulation 
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strategy is associated with a reciprocal relationship between the VMPFC and the amyg-
dala in the brain (Johnstone et al., 2007), and Wagner and Heatherton (2013) reported 
reduced connectivity between these brain areas after self-control exertion during as-
sumed spontaneous emotion regulation during picture-viewing. While these connectivity 
changes were not replicated in the present study, self-control exertion decreased activity 
in the VMPFC during viewing of negative pictures. This finding might suggest that partic-
ipants in the present study employed a less effortful emotion regulation strategy relying 
less strongly on the VMPCF and were thus less affected by self-control exertion. Note that 
decreases in VMPFC activity after self-control exertion were detected only after applica-
tion of a rather liberal statistical threshold, therefore this finding should be interpreted 
with caution. Nevertheless, future studies on self-control exertion and emotion regulation 
could profit from an explicit instruction to suppress emotions, which has also been shown 
to undermine memory formation (Binder et al., 2012).  
Finally, it should be noted that the analysis Wagner and Heatherton (2013) used 
to test for increased amygdala activity after self-control exertion was very liberal. It did 
not include a correction for multiple comparisons when testing for self-control exertion 
effects on brain activity. In addition, the reported specificity of the self-control exertion 
effect for negative pictures seems at least debatable as it appears there is a main effect of 
previous self-control exertion on all picture categories. Descriptively, increased amygdala 
activity was apparent for all, positive, neutral, and negative pictures in their study. The 
difference between conditions just only reached statistical significance for negative pic-
tures. Further research on the reliability of effects of self-control exertion on emotional 
reactivity is definitely warranted.  
The main extension of the present work beyond previous work was the investiga-
tion of self-control exertion effects on emotional memory. Since there was no self-control 
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exertion effect during encoding, it was only consequential that also no effect on emotional 
memory was found. In contrast, well-known memory effects were replicated, such that 
emotional information was better remembered than neutral ones, and that memory for-
mation critically depended on activity in the hippocampus. The initial hypothesis remains 
open for a test. Provided increased reactivity in the amygdala after self-control exertion 
during encoding of emotional scenes, research on emotional memory formation would 
still predict a recall advantage for persons after having exerted self-control.  
Conclusion 
In sum, manipulation checks, arousal data, and neural activity during the self-con-
trol manipulation tasks indicate that the self-control exertion manipulation was success-
ful. Nevertheless, there was no effect of self-control exertion on emotional processing and 
emotional memory thereafter. We conclude that increased amygdala activity in response 
to emotionally valenced stimuli is not a necessary consequence of prior self-control exer-
tion.  
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Supplementary Material 
Supplementary Table S1 
Areas with higher activation during the Stroop task (self-control exertion condition) than 
during the control task.  
 No. of   MNI coordinates  
Region voxels BA L/R x y z Z 
Precentral gyrus 23577 32 L -44 8 32 7.04 
  Inferior occipital gyrus  37 L -42 -62 -12 6.99 
  Superior parietal lobule  7 L -20 -58 42 6.97 
Middle frontal gyrus 221 45 R 46 40 20 5.30 
  Inferior frontal gyrus PTR  45 R 42 30 28 4.38 
  Inferior frontal gyrus PTR  45 R 50 28 26 3.56 
Inferior frontal gyrus POR 322 44 R 42 8 30 4.50 
  Middle frontal gyrus  6 R 50 10 44 3.57 
Olfactory cortex 43 25  0 0 -10 4.28 
Inferior frontal gyrus POR 24 11 L -18 34 -4 4.24 
Insula 168 47 R 32 28 0 4.21 
  Insula  48 R 28 30 12 4.07 
Caudate nucleus 64 25  0 22 6 4.19 
  Caudate nucleus   L -14 30 6 3.50 
Middle frontal gyrus 62 46 L -30 48 18 4.09 
Anterior cingulate cortex 11 47 R 18 32 4 4.09 
Middle frontal gyrus 9 6 L -30 -20 62 3.67 
Thalamus 18  L -4 -24 14 3.49 
Putamen 21 48 L -28 8 -4 3.49 
  Putamen  48 L -26 10 4 3.24 
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 No. of   MNI coordinates No. of 
Region voxels BA L/R x y z Z 
Middle frontal gyrus 8 46 R 38 44 28 3.36 
Putamen 5  R 26 4 4 3.33 
Thalamus 6  L -2 -12 20 3.31 
Left calcarine sulcus 8 17 L -12 -76 12 3.26 
Caudate nucleus 8  L -6 4 18 3.24 
Note. List of brain areas showing higher activity in the self-control exertion condition (in-
congruent trials vs. white baseline trials) than in the control condition (congruent trials 
vs. white baseline trials), thresholded at p < .001 (uncorrected) in a minimum of 5 adja-
cent voxels. Intendations indicate subpeaks within a larger area. BA, Brodmann Area, L, 
left, R, right, POR, pars orbitalis, PTR, Pars triangularis.  
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Supplementary Table S2 
Areas with higher activation during thought suppression (self-control exertion condition) 
than during a control task.  
 No. of   MNI coordinates  
Region voxels BA L/R x y z Z 
Putamen 11  R 22 -6 12 3.95 
Inferior frontal gyrus POR 7 47 L -30 32 -10 3.76 
Note. List of brain areas showing higher activity in the self-control exertion condition 
(thought suppression blocks vs. fixation) than in the control condition (free thought 
blocks vs. fixation), thresholded at p < .001 (uncorrected) in a minimum of 5 adjacent 
voxels. Intendations indicate subpeaks within a larger area. BA, Brodmann Area, L, left, R, 
right, POR, pars orbitalis. 
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Supplementary Table S3 
Remembered vs. forgotten pictures.  
 No. of   MNI coordinates  
Region voxels BA L/R x y z Z 
Inferior frontal gyrus POR 768 38 L -40 26 -14 6.07 
  Inferior frontal gyrus PT  47 L -46 18 0 5.18 
  Inferior frontal gyrus PT  47 L -36 28 6 4.05 
Medial frontal gyrus 2967 9 L 2 56 32 5.77 
  Medial frontal gyrus  32 L -6 52 20 5.73 
  Medial frontal gyrus  9 L -4 52 38 5.73 
Pallidum 316  L -10 -2 -8 5.19 
  Hippocampus  28 L -18 -4 -20 4.80 
  Parahippocampus  27 L -22 -30 -10 4.35 
Middle frontal gyrus 293 44 L -36 14 40 5.07 
  Middle frontal gyrus  8 L -30 16 50 4.35 
  Middle frontal gyrus  6 L -30 4 40 3.74 
Precuneus 627  L 0 -64 34 5.07 
  Precuneus   L -4 -56 32 4.79 
  Posterior cingulate cortex  30 R 4 -50 24 4.18 
Hippocampus 147 34 R 16 -2 -16 5.06 
  Hippocampus  35 R 12 -16 -12 3.75 
  Parahippocampus  35 R 6 -18 -18 3.72 
Inferior frontal gyrus POR 113 38 R 38 22 -18 4.92 
  Inferior frontal gyrus POR  38 R 42 32 -12 4.67 
  Inferior frontal gyrus POR  38 R 48 26 -10 3.50 
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 No. of   MNI coordinates  
Region voxels BA L/R x y z Z 
Angular gyrus 619 39 L -46 -66 38 4.76 
  Angular gyrus  39 L -46 -64 26 4.27 
  Angular gyrus  7 L -40 -62 50 4.21 
Thalamus 368  L -4 -12 6 4.72 
  Thalamus   L -2 -24 8 4.58 
  Caudate nucleus  25 L 8 8 0 4.26 
Inferior frontal gyrus PTR 191 47 R 48 24 -2 4.45 
  Inferior frontal gyrus PTR  48 R 40 26 10 3.47 
Fusiform gyrus 467 37 R 40 -56 -20 4.38 
  Inferior occipital cortex  19 R 36 -72 -10 4.29 
  Fusiform gyrus  37 R 40 -60 -12 4.06 
Cerebellum crus I 78  L -26 -74 -28 4.79 
Caudate nucleus 37  L -12 2 10 4.28 
  Pallidum   L -20 0 6 3.28 
Middle temporal gyrus 75 37 L -50 -58 0 4.19 
Supramarginal gyrus 60 40 L -58 -48 32 4.17 
  Supramarginal gyrus  22 L -58 -50 24 3.47 
Middle frontal gyrus 113 44 R 40 10 42 4.06 
  Middle frontal gyrus  9 R 48 16 42 4.06 
Caudate nucleus 25  R 14 18 4 4.43 
Calcarine sulcus 30 17 R 14 -84 4 4.42 
Fusiform gyrus 68 37 L -36 -54 -16 3.95 
Angular gyrus 97 39 R 38 -56 28 3.87 
  Angular gyrus  39 R 42 -60 38 3.75 
  Angular gyrus  39 R 32 -50 24 3.44 
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 No. of   MNI coordinates  
Region voxels BA L/R x y z Z 
Inferior occipital cortex 110 19 L -36 -78 -12 3.85 
  Middle occipital cortex  19 L -40 -76 0 3.27 
Pallidum 18  R 20 -2 8 3.84 
Anterior cingulate cortex 29 24 L 2 30 20 3.81 
Anterior cingulate cortex 5  R 6 8 26 3.75 
Fusiform gyrus 6 37 R 36 -46 -22 3.75 
Middle cingulate cortex 23 23 R 2 -14 40 3.74 
Olfactory cortex 21 48 R 30 10 -12 3.72 
  Putamen  48 R 34 0 -10 3.24 
Fusiform gyrus 28 18 R 24 -80 -12 3.70 
Anterior cingulate cortex 12  R 6 16 22 3.65 
Inferior frontal gyrus POR 19 47 L -46 38 -4 3.61 
Supramarginal gyrus 15 48 R 54 -48 28 3.60 
Middle temporal gyrus 10 37 L -44 -70 14 3.44 
Middle occipital gyrus 9 19 L -46 -76 -2 3.37 
Angular gyrus 6 7 R 36 -62 52 3.36 
Putamen 8 48 L -30 4 -6 3.35 
Middle cingulate cortex 11 23 L -2 -28 36 3.29 
Note. List of brain areas which were more activated during pictures which were later re-
membered than forgotten in the free recall task, thresholded at p < .001 (uncorrected) in 
a minimum of 5 adjacent voxels. Intendations indicate subpeaks within a larger area. BA, 
Brodmann Area, L, left, R, right, POR, pars orbitalis, PTR, Pars triangularis. 
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3 Discussion 
3.1 Revisiting the studies  
First study: When white bears and money influence self-control 
For the publication manuscript, we have focused on comparing our results to one 
specific motivational model, the process model. First, I will discuss our findings in light of 
three other self-control models, the opportunity cost model (Kurzban et al., 2013), the 
labor/leisure tradeoff model (Kool & Botvinick, 2014), and the resource allocation model 
(Beedie & Lane, 2012). Then I will compare this study to other brain imaging studies.  
According to the opportunity cost model, the thought-suppression task of our ex-
periment has bound more computational mechanisms than the control task. This resulted 
in opportunity costs, i.e. the computational mechanisms could not be deployed for other 
mental processes. The opportunity costs induced the subjective experience of effort, and 
thus lowered the motivation to deploy computational mechanisms for the subsequent 
Stroop task. Providing monetary incentives means that there are additional benefits re-
lated with task engagement. Conclusively, self-control exertion increases the costs of fur-
ther self-control acts, while incentives increase the benefits. In the framework of this 
model, brain activity changes, such as the ones found in the left IFG, should relate to 
changes in the deployment of computational mechanisms. This function could be at-
tributed to the IFG. The increased activity in the high-motivation depletion condition 
would mean that the incentive-induced benefits outweighed the costs originating from 
prior task engagement. Then IFG activity should have increased even further or at least 
as much in highly motivated non-depleted participants as in highly-motivated depleted 
participants. However, activity in this area was not increased in the highly motivated non-
depleted participants as compared to the regularly motivated participants. Thus, based 
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on very similar reasoning as against the process model, the opportunity cost model is un-
able to explain our findings.  
The labor/leisure tradeoff model suggests that activity in lateral prefrontal areas, 
especially the IFG, is related to effort and the subjective experience of task costs. The par-
ticularly strong IFG in highly motivated, depleted participants suggests that they invested 
extra effort in the task, and thus should experience higher subjective costs than partici-
pants in the other conditions. This is perfectly in agreement with our own interpretation. 
Yet similar to the process model and the opportunity cost model, the labor/leisure 
tradeoff model cannot give an adequate explanation why highly motivated, depleted par-
ticipants should invest greater effort, inducing even stronger aversive experiences of 
costs, then all other participants.  
Different from the opportunity cost model and the labor/leisure tradeoff model, 
the resource allocation model (Beedie & Lane, 2012) did not exclude the resource concept 
from their model, but argued the problem lies in allocating the resource, not in its supply. 
This model is practically indistinguishable from the strength model, which adopted this 
view in its most recent overhaul (Baumeister, 2014). It might be that the increased IFG 
activity in highly motivated depleted participants is related to allocating additional re-
sources to this area. This possibility will be discussed in more detail in chapter 3.3.  
Three other brain imaging studies reported that depletion induced changes in IFG 
functioning (Friese et al., 2013; Persson et al., 2013; Wagner et al., 2013). Thus IFG, which 
takes a central role in inhibition (e.g. Nee et al., 2007), is the most consistently reported 
area for depletion effects. One other study reported depletion-related increases in pre-
frontal areas. Specifically, Persson et al. (2013) found that depletion decreased activity in 
left prefrontal areas, but increased activity in similar right prefrontal areas. It cannot be 
ruled out that the right-lateralized increase might be part of the neural expression of self-
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control exertion effects. Yet in light of other studies only reporting decreases after self-
control exertion (e.g. Friese et al., 2013; Hedgcock, Vohs, & Rao, 2012), it seems unlikely 
that activity increases are responsible for depletion effects. Alternatively, Persson et al. 
(2013) suggest it might be a compensatory mechanism by which depleted participants 
try to make up for the loss of left-hemisphere resources. In our study, we found that mo-
tivation lead to a direct compensatory effect in the brain area which otherwise decreased 
its activity after self-control exertion. An important difference between these two findings 
is that the motivated group in our study was able to overcome depletion-related impair-
ments in performance, while Persson et al.ǯs (2013) sample of ǲregularly motivatedǳ, de-
pleted participants showed the usual performance impairments. Activating contralateral 
areas might be a less-effortful strategy, which has some beneficial effects for performance, 
but cannot fully compensate for the depletion effects. Similar effects can be observed after 
a brain stroke, when patients learn to use different or contralateral areas in tasks which 
normally rely on stroke-affected areas. While this compensation is beneficial, it is still ac-
companied by performance impairments. On the contrary in our study, boosting motiva-
tion in depleted participants might have pushed them to adopt a more effortful, but more 
effective strategy to overcome self-control exertion – which was to increase activity in an 
area most specialized for the task at hand and itself affected by self-control exertion.  
In sum, our findings are difficult to reconcile with a purely motivational account of 
self-control. Highly motivated, depleted participants had to compensate for something 
which did not instantly replenish with a motivational boost. The best explanation remains 
that these participants had to overcome a partial depletion of self-control resources. In 
line with the resource conservation principle, depletion made participants less willing to 
spend more self-control resources, but they could do so if they were sufficiently moti-
vated. Integrating concepts from the labor/leisure tradeoff model, one may reason that 
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individuals are motivated to conserve the resource because engaging in self-control be-
comes subjectively more costly when less of the resource is available.  
 
Second study: Lingering effects of depletion on the human brain at rest 
Brain activity during emotion suppression was in expected areas, but unusually 
weak in comparison to meta-analytic findings (Buhle et al., 2014; Diekhof et al., 2011; 
Frank et al., 2014; Kohn et al., 2014). Prefrontal areas did not survive correction for mul-
tiple comparisons, even if small-volume correction was applied to the area of interest, the 
IFG. One might wonder if effects on the subsequent resting state would have been 
stronger or different, had we found stronger emotion suppression activation. Cautionary 
words are also appropriate in relation to the finding of altered connectivity between the 
IFG and the OFC. The affected cluster in the OFC lies in its most anterior part, directly 
inferior to the frontal pole. This area is very exposed in the sense that it is encompassed 
by a lot of non-brain tissue. Small movements can cause the same voxels in this area to 
measure varying proportions of brain and non-brain tissue, which leads to signal fluctua-
tions of a much higher magnitude than the BOLD effect. The OFC is not traditionally asso-
ciated with emotion suppression or other regulatory processes and we cannot exclude 
the possibility that the presumed connectivity changes might be due to motion artifacts, 
even after the application of methods to correct for movement. 
Our findings are somewhat at odds with a study by Wagner and Heatherton 
(2013), which reported that prior self-control exertion led to decreased connectivity be-
tween the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the amygdala during an emotional picture 
task. Different from our study, this was a psychophysiological interaction analysis during 
the task, the emotional picture task served as dependent second task, and there was no 
instruction to suppress emotional responses. On the one hand, under the assumption that 
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connectivity changes during rest reflect previous task-related activity, it is surprising that 
we found no connectivity changes related to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex or the 
amygdala. On the other hand, the study from Wagner and Heatherton (2013) can be crit-
icized on multiple grounds (see chapter 2.3 and the next section), and our finding of in-
creased connectivity related to the IFG is in line with the majority of neuroscientific 
depletion studies (Friese et al., 2013; Luethi, Friese, Binder, et al., submitted; Persson et 
al., 2013; Wagner et al., 2013). 
 
Third study: Self-control exertion and emotion regulation 
The fundamental question for our study is why we were not able to replicate the 
findings from Wagner and Heatherton (2013). We have described statistical concerns 
about their methods in the manuscript (chapter 2.3) and concluded that changes in amyg-
dala activity might not be a reliable consequence of depletion. Here I will explore other 
potential explanations for the differing findings which concern the way emotion regula-
tion and self-control interact. Because we found no self-control exertion effects on emo-
tional processing, it is consequential that emotional memory performance was not 
affected as well. Thus I will not discuss these results again. 
In retrospect, the potentially biggest flaw in the study design is that we do not 
know if the participants engaged in emotion regulation at all, and if they did so, how much 
effort they invested into emotion regulation and what emotion regulation strategies they 
used. This issue becomes even more pressing in consideration of a recent study by Wang 
et al. (2014), which suggested that suppression, but not reappraisal, demands effort and 
induces self-control exertion. This finding integrates well with general comparisons of 
emotion regulation strategies. Overall, reappraisal seems to be a more successful strategy 
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to regulate emotions than suppression in terms of affective, cognitive, and social out-
comes. Reappraisal decreases the emotional experience to a larger degree than suppres-
sion (Gross, 2002). On the other hand, suppression, but not reappraisal, increases 
sympathetic activation above baseline, as indicated by electrodermal activity and the car-
diovascular system (Gross, 2002; Richards, 2004). This increase has been interpreted to 
reflect the greater cognitive costs of suppression. Suppression, especially concealing out-
wards signs of emotions, needs constant monitoring and correction throughout an emo-
tional experience. By contrast, reappraisal is evoked earlier in the emotion generation 
process and requires less continual self-regulatory effort during an emotional event. Fur-
thermore, it has been shown that suppression, but no reappraisal, impairs subsequent 
memory. Relying on the concept of limited parallel computational capacities (e.g. Kurzban 
et al., 2013), this may indicate that suppression demands more computational mecha-
nisms than reappraisal, which could otherwise support successful memory encoding. 
Other emotion regulation strategies exist (see chapter 1.5), though they have been stud-
ied less. Like reappraisal, they are antecedent-focused, hence one could speculate that 
they are less effortful than suppression. Critically, only suppression refers to inhibition of 
an emotional response, which makes it more similar to the core component of self-control 
and thus more likely to depend on the same limited resource as self-control, than other 
emotion regulation strategies.  
Wagner & Heatherton (2013) reported a weakened connectivity between the 
amygdala and the VMPFC after depletion. The authors argue that the VMPFC is an area 
commonly associated with emotion regulation. Only one meta-analysis out of four re-
ported activity in the VMPFC (Diekhof et al., 2011). A closer inspection revealed that the 
activity in the VMPFC originated from three studies only. Two of these used an emotion 
regulation instruction which mixed reappraisal and suppression (Johnstone et al., 2007; 
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Urry et al., 2006). In the third study, participants were instructed to reappraise, but stim-
uli were fear-conditioned with electric shocks (Delgado, Nearing, LeDoux, & Phelps, 
2008). One could argue that enduring electric shocks involves suppression in addition to 
reappraisal in order to cope with the pain. In sum, while the VMPFC does not seem to be 
a central area of emotion regulation, it may be that this area has a more specific role in 
emotion suppression. However, caution is necessary when comparing these meta-anal-
yses to spontaneous emotion regulation as in the study by Wagner and Heatherton 
(2013). Typical emotion regulation studies, which are the main bulk of these meta-anal-
yses, compare emotional pictures with the instruction to regulate emotion to neutral or 
emotional pictures with no instruction to regulate. Wagner and Heatherton (2013) and 
our study compared emotional pictures to neutral pictures. Thus we cannot exclude the 
possibility that VMPFC activity is related to the differences in contrasts. For example, it 
could be that the VMPFC is activated when participants are spontaneously engaging in 
emotion regulation, as compared to being explicitly told to do so.  
Regarding our own study, we also found that depletion reduced activity in the 
VMPFC. This might be interpreted as evidence that there is a depletion effect, but it had 
no consequences for emotion regulation, as participants chose other emotion regulation 
strategies which did not involve the VMPFC. There are two critical remarks to this inter-
pretation. First, in order to show depletion-induced decreases, the VMPFC must have 
shown some level of activity prior to depletion. This may suggest that participants used 
suppression to regulate emotions prior to self-control exertion, but switched to other 
emotion regulation strategies not dependent on the VMPFC when depleted. While this is 
theoretically possible, it is highly speculative. Second, our finding, even though part of the 
VMPFC, lies superior to the one reported by Wagner and Heatherton (2013). Anatomical 
connections between the amygdala and the VMPFC are highest in its inferior and caudal 
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sections, which are closer to the amygdala (Ghashghaei, Hilgetag, & Barbas, 2007). This 
renders it somewhat less likely that the area of VMPFC where we found depletion-induced 
activity changes is directly involved in emotion regulation. In face of these critical re-
marks, our VMPFC finding is puzzling. One may add that the activity changes were rela-
tively weak and did not survive appropriate correction for multiple comparisons.  
Conclusively, it might be that the participants in Wagner and (eathertonǯs ȋʹͲͳ͵Ȍ 
study regulated emotions primarily by suppression, whereas the participants in our study 
engaged more often in less demanding emotion regulation strategies, such as reappraisal. 
This possibility seems to be in line with cultural differences in the habitual use of emotion 
regulation strategies. A cross-cultural study revealed that Swiss citizens as compared to 
citizens of the USA make relatively more habitual use of reappraisal than suppression to 
regulate emotions (Matsumoto, Yoo, & Nakagawa, 2008). Unfortunately, neither Wagner 
and Heatherton (2013) nor we have assessed what emotion regulation strategies the par-
ticipants pursued and thus any conclusions remain highly speculative. Another possibility 
is that the usage of two self-control exertion tasks in our study induced lower levels of 
self-control exertion than one self-control task. This seems counter-intuitive, yet there is 
some evidence for this effect (Carter et al., 2015). In any case, research on self-control 
(Wang et al., 2014) and emotion regulation (Gross, 2002; Richards, 2004) suggest that it 
is specifically emotion suppression which is costly and thus susceptible to self-control ex-
ertion manipulations. Future research examining self-control and emotion regulation in-
teractions would profit from an explicit instruction to suppress emotional responses.  
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3.2 An integrative neuroscientific perspective on depletion 
This chapter will focus on two things. First, mainly based on fMRI studies, I will 
circumscribe which brain areas are critically involved in self-control exertion effects. Sec-
ond, I will review what neurophysiological findings might tell us about a possible physical 
basis of the self-control resource. Table 1 provides an overview of all brain areas which 
have been found to reduce functioning after depletion. All seven studies reported changes 
in prefrontal areas. The most reported finding was reduced activity in lateral prefrontal 
areas after self-control exertion (see Fig. 3 for an overview of these papers). These areas 
has been identified as a key structure for cognitive and emotional control (chapters 1.3 & 
1.5). This supports the view that self-control fails because of a breakdown of top-down 
control (Heatherton & Wagner, 2011). 
A closer look reveals that the brain area of depletion-induced reduction can be re-
lated to the second task. Hedgcock et al. (2012) used a choice task where participants 
chose between indulgent and healthy snacks. The primary aspect of exerting self-control 
in this context might be to weigh the different options against each other and select the 
one which is in line with long-term goals. These mental operations are associated with the 
MFG, which was the area with reduced activity after self-control exertion in Hedgcock et al.ǯs ȋʹͲͳʹȌ study. )n Persson et al.ǯs ȋʹͲͳ͵Ȍ experiment, participants had to generate a 
verb associated with a presented noun. Verb selection is not related to goals and thus 
quick task processing might be more dependent on inhibiting alternatives once an answer 
has come to mind. Accordingly, depletion reduced activity in the IFG. Furthermore, in line with the taskǯs heavy reliance on language, this activity change was in the left hemisphere. 
Two studies used the Stroop task as their second task (Friese et al., 2013; Luethi, Friese, 
Binder, et al., submitted). The Stroop task is cognitively very demanding and it has been 
argued that correct task processing relies both on response selection and inhibition. 
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Hence activity occurs bilaterally in the MFG and IFG (Nee et al., 2007). Indeed, Friese et 
al. (2013) found decreased activity in the right MFG and IFG after depletion. In our study 
(Luethi, Friese, Binder, et al., submitted), activity changes only occurred in the left IFG, but 
given the verbal nature of the task, this is a very critical area for task processing. Wagner 
et al. (2013) also reported changes in the IFG after depletion, yet not activity reductions 
but decreased connectivity with the OFC. During the second task, dieters watched tempt-
ing food items, but did not have to respond to them. Thus the IFG was probably involved 
in inhibiting the craving for food induced by the pictures. Finally, two studies, where the 
second task was related to emotional processing, showed changes in the VMPFC (Luethi, 
Friese, Binder, et al., submitted; Wagner & Heatherton, 2013). 
Based on this rather small sample of studies, it is not clear if the first task contrib-
utes to the exact area of depletion-induced activity changes. Persson et al. (2013) con-
ducted a conjunction analysis where they could reveal that the IFG was the only area 
which was significantly activated by both tasks. While it was not a perfect overlap, the 
cluster identified was very close to the one showing depletion effects. This suggests that 
resource depletion occurs in brain areas which are heavily involved in both tasks. Unfor-
tunately, the other studies did not report brain activity from the first task. In our own 
studies, we either found no depletion effects (Luethi, Friese, Schroeder, et al., submitted) 
or no activity during the first task (Luethi, Friese, Binder, et al., submitted). In the latter 
case, this was probably due to a power problem. Participants had to suppress thoughts 
during blocks of 60 s in the first task. Blocks with a longer duration than approximately 
20 s become increasingly less likely to detect signal changes because of necessary high-
pass filtering of the brain signal (Amaro & Barker, 2006).  
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Fig. 3. Findings of reduced lateral prefrontal activity after self-control exertion. (a) Retrieved from ǲReducing self-control depletion effects through enhanced sensitivity to implementation: Evidence from fMR) and behavioral studiesǳ by W. M. (edgcock, K. D. 
Vohs, & A. R. Rao, 2012, Journal of Consumer Psychology, 22, p. 489. (b) Retrieved from ǲSuppressing emotions impairs subsequent Stroop performance and reduces prefrontal brain activationǳ by M. Friese, J. Binder, R. Luechinger, P. Boesiger, & B. Rasch, 2013, PLOS 
ONE, ͺ, p. ͹. ȋcȌ Retrieved from ǲ)maging fatigue of interference control reveals the neural basis of executive resource depletionǳ by J. Persson, A. Larsson, & P. A. Reuter-Lorenz, 
2013, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 25, p. 346. These authors did not provide a scale 
for the figure. (d) Retrieved from our second publication manuscript.¨ 
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While the exact location of depletion effects varies, the studies consistently re-
ported changes in functionality within a domain-general network of cognitive control. 
Hence, these findings also support a general domain of self-control, which is one of the 
central assumptions of the strength model (e.g. Baumeister et al., 2007). The most fre-
quent finding was that the IFG showed reduced functioning after depletion. This area has 
been associated with inhibition in general (Aron et al., 2014; Aron, 2007; but see Swick & 
Chatham, 2014, for a different view). Others have shown that activity in the IFG overlaps 
during various acts of self-control (Tabibnia et al., 2014). Besides the IFG, fMRI studies 
found depletion-induced activity decreases in the MFG, which has been associated with 
response selection (Nee et al., 2007). In the two-stage model of self-control (Myrseth & 
Fishbach, 2009), inhibition and response selection are summarized as the implementa-
tion stage of self-control. The other, earlier stage is recognizing the need for self-control, 
which is anatomically linked to the ACC. Friese et al. (2013) specifically tested for deple-
tion-induced changes in the ACC (which is associated with monitoring), but found no ef-
fects. Only Persson et al. (2013) reported that depletion decreased activity in the ACC, in 
addition to decreases in the IFG. These studies in concert suggest that depletion impairs 
primarily the implementation stage of self-control. However, two EEG studies led to dif-
ferent conclusions (Inzlicht & Gutsell, 2007; Wang et al., 2014). They reported depletion 
induced changes in the error-related negativity (ERN), a part of the event-related poten-
tial associated with error monitoring and the ACC (Van Veen & Carter, 2002; Van Veen & 
Miller, 2007). The comparability of the opposing findings is hampered by the fact that they 
stem from different methods, and that fMRI models are based on correct trials, whereas 
the ERN follows error trials. Yet EEG does not provide the means to clearly locate the 
measured signal and it cannot be excluded that lateral prefrontal areas play a (minor) role 
in the generation of the ERN besides the ACC. It is at least very likely that prefrontal areas 
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were less activated during error trials than during correct trials. In sum, for the time be-
ing, we cannot exclude the possibility that depletion affects conflict monitoring in addition 
to self-control implementation. Further research is definitively warranted. Potentially a 
combined EEG/fMRI depletion study might reveal new insights into this matter.  
A final question is how the VMPFC finding can be integrated into the neural frame-
work of depletion provided by the other studies. This area does not form part of a domain-
general control network. As discussed previously, this finding stems from one study 
(Wagner & Heatherton, 2013), but we were unable to reproduce it and have questioned 
these results on statistical grounds (chapter 2.2). Most meta-analyses report that areas 
involved in emotion regulation highly overlap with the cognitive control network (Buhle 
et al., 2014; Frank et al., 2014; Webb, Miles, & Sheeran, 2012). Nevertheless, it could be 
that the VMPFC takes a more down-stream role in emotion suppression which is ulti-
mately controlled by lateral prefrontal areas. This assumption is accordance with anatom-
ical research reporting that direct connections between lateral prefrontal areas and the 
amygdala are fewer than between the VMPFC and the amygdala (Ghashghaei et al., 2007).  
In conclusion, depletion effects seem to mainly relate to prefrontal areas which are 
also critically involved in cognitive control, especially the IFG. This supports the notion of 
the domain-generality of self-control. In addition, depletion seems more likely to affect 
the lateral prefrontal areas implicated in the implementation of self-control than the ACC 
implicated in conflict detection.  
Next I will give an overview of potential neurophysiological bases for the self-con-
trol resource.  Baumeister (2014) recently defended the notion that glucose is the physi-
ological basis for the limited self-control resource, yet left it unclear how this relates to 
neurophysiological processes. Kurzban (2010) has challenged this assumption to be 
highly implausible based on neurophysiological work. He cited work from Raichle and 
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Mintun (2006) which concluded that local energy usage rises no more than a few percent 
when task demands increase. In a next step, Kurzban (2010) incorrectly assumed that 
energy expenditure is synonymous with glucose consumption. However, Raichle and Min-
tun (2006) also cited their earlier work which showed that increases in local blood flow 
in response to increased task demands led to increases in glucose uptake by as much as 
51% (P. T. Fox, Raichle, Mintun, & Dence, 1988). In other words, increases of local glucose 
usage are proven to be around 50 times higher than what Kurzban (2010) assumed. The 
difference between energy consumption and glucose uptake derives from the fact that 
local oxygen uptake only changes very little. Oxygen is used in combination with glucose 
for efficient energy production, whereas consumption of glucose without oxygen (anaer-
obic glycolysis) is highly inefficient. Nevertheless, it remains highly implausible that a 
measureable effect in the blood glucose levels would appear. Yet one could interpret this 
finding as evidence for the resource allocation hypothesis. Local blood flow is increased 
in response to increased neural activity levels, allowing allocating additional glucose to 
this area. While this possibility cannot be excluded, it is not what Raichle and Mintun 
(2006) inferred. They pointed out that neural tissue has stored abundant amounts of glu-
cose (and glycogen), making adequate reserves available in times of higher need. They 
conclude that usage of additional glucose (or oxygen) cannot be responsible for the in-
creases in local blood flow, and that the function of this phenomenon is unknown. They suggest that ǲone might consider the possibility that it [=increase in local blood flow] is 
used for the removal of the excess lactate produced [as a byproduct of anaerobic glycoly-
sis] during an increase in activity or the adjustment of the acid-base or ionic balance of 
the tissue. Likewise, temperature regulation, a long-overlooked subject, may be playing some role.ǳ ȋRaichle & Mintun, ʹͲͲ͸, p. Ͷ͸ͺȌ. It could be that any of these physiological 
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factors form the base for the self-control resource, though this is highly speculative. An-
other idea is that local availability of neurotransmitters might decrease after a period of 
increased activity, potentially having a negative impact on synaptic efficacy (Brzezicka, 
Kaminski, & Wróbelb, 2013). Critically, it is difficult to explain why this resource problem 
should be specific to self-control and not be related to all kinds of neural information pro-
cessing, such as input in the visual system. In summary, no conclusion can be drawn with 
respect to the neurophysiological basis of the self-control resource.  
 
 
3.3 Difficulties replicating depletion 
During my PhD project, I encountered problems to replicate depletion effects. One 
fMRI study failed to find evidence for depletion, and another pilot study was unsuccessful 
at inducing depletion effects as well. Furthermore, I have been involved in a collaborative 
project where we looked at potential depletion effects in three study samples where par-
ticipants engaged in a series of working memory tasks, including Stroop and Flanker 
tasks, over a period of two hours or more (De Simoni, Luethi, & Von Bastian, in 
preparation). According to the study from Vohs et al. (2013) and our general understand-
ing of the strength model, we assumed that severe levels of depletion should occur over 
the course of the tasks. In two studies, there was no effect and in the third, participants 
became better at tasks if they had engaged in other tasks previously. In sum, only two out 
of five study projects I have been involved in showed self-control exertion effects, and one 
(first study) demonstrated the expected drop in performance (while the other measured 
effects on resting state connectivity, second study). In this chapter, I will first list factors 
which possibly complicate the transition from social-psychological, behavioral studies to 
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fMRI. Then I will discuss the very recent meta-analytic debate about the reliability of de-
pletion effects.  
Regarding the transition to fMRI, a first complicating factor is that some tasks can-
not be used or would be very difficult to adapt for an fMRI study. Frequently used example 
tasks are anagrams, handgrip, crossing out letters (Hagger et al., 2010). This often leads 
to a more cognitive focus in fMRI tasks. Secondly, fMRI tasks have to be longer than the 
average behavioral depletion task. In order to achieve a satisfactory signal-to-noise ratio 
for the brain signal, a trial has to be repeated 20 times at the minimum. Thirdly, fMRI 
studies must rely on computerized versions of tasks which is usually not the case in social-
psychological experiments. It could be that the socially more interactive nature of behav-
ioral experiments somehow contributes to depletion effects. Fourthly, fMRI scanning re-
quires participants to lay as still as possible in order to measure an undistorted brain 
signal. They must inhibit any movements, which could already induce some amount of 
depletion in all participants, which increases with longer scanning duration. Fifthly, in 
many participants, the hospital setting and the knowledge of having their brains scanned 
creates excitement and thus they might be more motivated than in a behavioral study. 
Furthermore, at least in Switzerland, participants are much better paid for fMRI studies, 
as they have to receive CHF 25 per hour by law. In behavioral studies, individuals often 
participate for course credit or for a payment of CHF 15 per hour or less. These two factors 
might motivate participants to invest more effort in fMRI studies, which could possibly 
counteract depletion effects. 
In light of the difficulties to reproduce depletion effects, one might also wonder 
about the overall reliability of depletion effects. The commonly known meta-analysis was 
conducted by Hagger et al. (2010) and led them to conclude that ǲthe strength model is a 
useful explanatory system with which to understand self-controlǳ ȋp. ͷʹͲȌ and that the 
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results ǲcorroborate the view that self-control draws from a single, global resource and 
depletion is not an artifact of specific spheres and tasksǳ ȋp. ͷͳͷȌ. Yet, more recently 
Carter and McCullough (Carter et al., 2015; Carter & McCullough, 2013, 2014) conducted 
several meta-analytic tests and reported that they ǲfound only scant evidence that the de-
pletion effect is distinguishable from zeroǳ ȋp. ͹ͻ͸, 2015), and that ǲthe meta-analytic ev-
idence does not support the proposition (and popular belief) that self-control functions as if it relies on a limited resourceǳ ȋp. ͺͳ͵, 2015). How can it be that meta-analyses ex-
amining the same effect arrive at opposing conclusions? In short, Carter et al. (2013, 2014, 
2015) make two major claims why Hagger et al.ǯs (2010) analysis is flawed. One, Hagger 
et al. (2010) did not take adequate steps to test and correct for publication bias. Two, 
some of the experiments in the meta-analysis by Hagger et al. (2015) did not measure 
self-control directly. Carter et al.ǯs ȋʹͲͳͶ, 2015) crushing verdict is based on a reanalysis of (agger et al.ǯs ȋʹͲͳͲȌ original data as well as a recently published new meta-analysis 
on depletion effects. They independently searched for published and unpublished deple-
tion studies and only included experiments with frequently used tasks in the analysis, 
which also led to a restriction to studies that tested the core depletion effect. The publica-
tion from Carter et al., (2014, 2015) has resulted in immediate reactions and attempts to 
rebut their meta-analytic techniques (Gervais, 2015; Hagger & Chatzisarantis, 2014; 
Inzlicht, Gervais, & Berkman, 2015). Most recently, Inzlicht et al. (2015) agree that meta-
analyses on depletion should be bias-corrected, yet they suggest that Carter et al.ǯs ȋʹͲͳͷȌ ǲcorrection attempts might themselves be in need of correction.ǳ ȋp.ͳ͵Ȍ. Based on further 
meta-analytic tests, Inzlicht et al. (2015) reported a moderate depletion effect and stated 
that ǲ[at] the very least, concluding that the ego depletion effect is zero based on these techniques is prematureǳ ȋp. ͳ͵Ȍ. In light of these widely different conclusions, the ques-
tion remains which is the more accurate interpretation of the empirical findings. In order 
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to be able to judge for oneself, a more detailed and critical look at the meta-analyses is 
necessary. I will continue this chapter with a comparison of the reported effect sizes, how 
publication bias was estimated, and what steps were taken to correct for it. Following the 
claim from Inzlicht et al. (2015) that sample sizes become too small for meta-analytic tests 
when studies are split into different depletion subdomains, I will restrict reporting to the 
estimation of the overall depletion effect size.  
Meta-analytic effect sizes of depletion. As reported in the introduction, Hagger et al. 
(2010) found an overall medium-to-large effect size d = 0.62 (Confidence Interval [0.57, Ͳ.͸͹]Ȍ, which was verified by Carter and McCullough ȋʹͲͳͶȌ. )n Carter et al.ǯs new meta-
analysis, a reduced overall effect size was reported of d = 0.43 (Confidence Interval [0.34, 
0.52]), equal to a small-to-medium effect. This difference arises from the different study 
inclusion criteria outlined above. )nzlicht et al. ȋʹͲͳͷȌ state that Carter et al.ǯs ȋʹͲͳͷȌ new 
sample is an improvement over the one from Hagger et al. (2010), providing a better foun-
dation to estimate the true depletion effect. 
Estimation of publication bias. Any meta-analysis might be biased to the extent that 
the underlying sample of experiments misrepresents the population of all experiments 
conducted on a particular effect. The main concern is that studies with significant out-
comes are more likely to be submitted and accepted for publication than studies without 
significant outcomes. This phenomenon is known as publication bias or file-drawer symp-
tom. Finding signs of publication bias is very common when conducting meta-analyses 
(Ferguson & Brannick, 2012). Hagger et al. evaluated this possibility by calculating the 
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fail-safe N1 (Rosenberg, 2005), a frequently used method to deal with publication biases 
in psychological science (Carter & McCullough, 2014). This method suggested the findings 
stand robustly against a potential bias. However, the fail-safe N has been widely criticized 
for relying on unrealistic assumptions and statisticians recommended against its use 
(Ferguson & Brannick, 2012; J. P. A. Ioannidis, 2008). Other estimations uniformly indi-
cated evidence for the presence of a bias in both depletion datasets (Test for Excess Sta-
tistical Significance, Trim and Fill, meta-regression models). Furthermore, the presence 
of a bias can be diagnosed by visual inspection of funnel plots2. Figure 3 presents a funnel 
                                                        
1 The fail-safe N estimates the number of unpublished experiments with an aver-
age effect of zero that would have to exist in order to bring the meta-analytically calcu-lated effect size down to zero. (agger et al. ȋʹͲͳͲȌ found this would have to be ͷͲǯͶͶͷ 
unpublished, insignificant experiments. Understandably, Hagger et al. (2010) concluded 
it is highly unlikely that such a big number of unpublished depletion studies existed. 
2 Funnel plots compare the standard errors of effect sizes against the magnitude of 
the effect sizes. Standard errors provide an estimation of the random error and thus of 
the achieved measurement precision. Every time an effect is measured, it is affected by a 
random error, which causes study outcomes to fluctuate around the true effect, some-
times underestimating, sometimes overestimating its magnitude. Random errors are 
heavily influenced by study size: The outcomes of larger studies are expected to lie closer 
to the true effect size, whereas smaller studies are less precise and their outcomes are 
more scattered. A publication bias prevents smaller studies with smaller effects from get-
ting published, while smaller studies with overly large effects appear more often in pub-
lished studies. This results in an asymmetrical distribution of studies. In some cases, such 
asymmetry might be caused by other reasons than a publication bias, thus they are col-lectively referred to as ǲsmall-study effectsǳ. For example, in treatment studies it is often 
the case that smaller (pilot) studies are conducted with high-risk patients that profit more 
from treatment than patients in larger samples. For depletion studies however, the most 
plausible cause for a small-study effect is a publication bias.  
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plot for all studies included in the meta-analysis by Hagger et al. (2010) and strongly sug-
gests the presence of a publication bias. Inzlicht et al. (2015) again agree with Carter et al. 
(2013, 2014, 2015) that correction for publication bias should be applied.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Contour-enhanced funnel plot of published depletion studies. Studies should 
scatter into a symmetrical funnel shape. When studies are highly precise (mainly due to 
big sample sizes), the standard error will be small and outcomes will cluster tightly 
around the true effect size (top end of funnel). When studies are less precise (mainly due 
to small sample sizes), outcomes will deviate more to the left and right of the true effect 
size (bottom end of funnel). The grey area represents the expected distribution under the 
assumption of a null effect. Effect sizes that fall within this area are non-significant. The 
solid/dashed vertical line represents the estimate for the overall effect from a fixed-ef-
fect/random-effects model. The solid angled lines represent the bounds within which 
95% of the studies should fall, given the estimated effect size. If there was no publication 
bias, studies would fall equally and symmetrically to the left and right of the estimated 
effect size, within the funnel indicated by the solid lines. Instead, measurements are asym-
metrically distributed, such that studies with a higher standard error consistently show a 
higher effect than studies with a lower standard error. Retrieved from ǲPublication bias 
and the limited strength model of self-control: Has the evidence for ego depletion been overestimated?ǳ by E. Carter and M. McCullough, ʹͲͳͶ, Frontiers in Psychology, 5, p. 7. 
 
Correcting for publication bias. Different ways to correct the estimated effect size 
for a publication bias exist, which are the trim-and-fill method (Duval & Tweedie, 2000), 
meta-regression models based on PET-PEESE (Egger, Smith, Schneider, & Minder, 1997; 
Difficulties replicating depletion 
132 
Moreno et al., 2009), the p-curve estimate (Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 2014), or re-
striction to the top-10 studies with the highest sample size (Stanley, Jarrell, & 
Doucouliagos, 2010). The trim-and-fill method re-estimated a small or medium effect size, depending on the dataset ȋ(agger et al.ǯs ȋʹͲͳͲȌ dataset: g = 0.48, Confidence Interval 
[0.44, 0.51]); Carter et al.ǯs ȋʹͲͳͷȌ dataset: g = 0.24, Confidence Interval [0.13, 0.34]). Even 
though the trim-and-fill method is more commonly used in psychological science, statis-
ticians argue that it tends to under-correct for publication bias (Moreno et al., 2009; 
Rücker, Carpenter, & Schwarzer, 2011). For meta-regression models, there are two differ-
ent implementations: the Precision Effect Test (PET) and the Precision Effect Estimate 
with Standard Error (PEESE). Carter et al. (2014, 2015) have used them inconsistently 
over their two meta-analyses in order to show that depletion effects are always indistin-
guishable from zero. While PET arrives at strongly negative effect sizes in some cases, I 
would argue that PEESE might produce more probable corrections. PEESE indicates ei-
ther a small depletion effect (based on Hagger et al.ǯs (2010) dataset: g = 0.25, Confidence 
Interval [0.18, 0.32]) or a zero effect (based on Carter et al.ǯs ȋʹͲͳͷȌ dataset: g = 0.01, 
Confidence Interval [-0.14, 0.15]). While Carter et al. (2015) argue that meta-regression 
models fare better than other techniques on simulated and real data, Gervais (2015) am-
ply demonstrated on simulated data that meta-regression models consistently underesti-
mate the underlying effect if it is heterogeneous, which is highly plausible for depletion 
effects. With simulations aiming at realistic conditions resembling the depletion research, 
meta-regression models distorted the effect size by over 50%, often returning null effects 
even when there was a true effect (Inzlicht et al., 2015). Instead, Inzlicht et al. (2015) in-
troduce the p-curve estimate, which showed an acceptable performance in their simula-
tions. Applied solely to Carter et al.ǯs ȋʹͲͳͷȌ dataset, p-curves indicated a medium 
depletion effect size (g = 0.55, Confidence Interval [0.45, 0.59]). Like meta-regression 
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methods, the p-curve estimate is a fairly new technique, which has seen little application 
so far. It is odd that the p-curve estimate returns a corrected effect size that is larger than 
the original uncorrected effect size. This technique was specifically developed to correct 
for bias without requiring access to nonsignificant results, yet Inzlicht et al. (2015) ap-plied it to Carter et al.ǯs ȋʹͲͳͷȌ dataset, which contained unpublished and nonsignificant 
results. Finally, the estimate derived from the top-10 studies with the highest sample size was also applied to Carter et al.ǯs ȋʹͲͳͷȌ dataset, which returned a small effect size ȋg = 
0.26, Confidence Interval [0.07, 0.44]; Inzlicht et al., 2015).  
It seems that meta-analyses, with a plethora of techniques to choose from, are far 
from objective tools to estimate effect sizes in an unbiased way. The majority of tests and 
visual inspection of the data indicate that a correction for publication bias is warranted. 
In agreement with Carter et al. ȋʹͲͳͷȌ and )nzlicht et al. ȋʹͲͳͷȌ, Carter et al.ǯs ȋʹͲͳͷȌ da-
taset might provide a more suitable basis to estimate the true depletion effect size. Similar 
to Inzlicht et al. (2015), I suggest it is advisable to consider a range of effect sizes which 
are all possible, as ordered by magnitude: (a) the estimate derived from the p-curve (g = 
0.55), (b) the uncorrected estimate from Carter et al. (2015), which consists of 41% un-
published studies (g = 0.43), (c) the estimate derived from the top-10 studies (g = 0.26), 
(d) the trim-and-fill derived estimate (g = 0.24), and (e) the estimate derived from PEESE 
(g = 0). In conclusion, the true depletion effect has most likely a magnitude between zero 
and medium (g = 0.55). Based on the most favorable circumstances, the p-curve estima-
tion, 53 participants per group are required to achieve 80% power to detect a depletion 
effect. According to the trim-and-fill correction method, which is a fairly established tech-
nique and its estimation lies in the middle of other estimates, this number rises to 274 
participants per group. While these numbers are above realistic sample sizes in fMRI-
studies, also behavioral scientists measured less participants in most studies (median N 
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= 48; Carter et al., 2015). Therefore, overall statistical power was low, and one may won-
der why there were so many significant findings at all. When looking at the funnel plot 
(Fig. 4), one can notice a big cluster of studies lying directly to the right of the grey area, 
thus just below the significance threshold. One may speculate that at least part of these 
results stem from researchers turning less favorable findings into favorable ones, e.g. by 
statistical adjustments, restricting reporting only to significant outcome variables and/or 
statistical tests with significant outcomes. These and other questionable research prac-
tices are believed to be fairly common in all fields of psychology (John, Loewenstein, & 
Prelec, 2012; Simmons et al., 2011). Altogether, the analyses and considerations suggest 
that there is reason to adopt a critical attitude towards the current depletion research.  
 
 
3.4 Future research questions 
With regard to the controversial meta-analytic findings (Carter et al., 2015; Carter 
& McCullough, 2013, 2014; Hagger et al., 2010; Inzlicht et al., 2015), future research 
should focus on examining the reliability of depletion effects. All researchers involved 
have recommended that large, pre-registered direct replications of depletion studies 
should be conducted. In fact, Holcombe and Hagger have already initiated such a project 
(see https://osf.io/jymhe/).  
If replication projects are able to reproduce depletion effects, several interesting 
study lines exist. Here I will list open questions in depletion research and finally provide 
a more detailed description of a study outline which would integrate several new ap-
proaches to examine depletion. First, one could re-examine interactions between deple-
tion, emotion regulation, and emotional memory formation. This would essentially be the 
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same study as our third study (chapter 2.3), but participants should be explicitly in-
structed to suppress emotional reactions. Secondly, magnetic resonance spectroscopy 
(MRS) might allow new insights into the physical basis of the self-control resource. MRS 
measures concentration of various neurometabolites in a circumscribed area of the brain. 
Based on our review of neuroscientific depletion studies, such an approach could focus 
on the IFG. Thirdly, from the perspective of research on cognitive control, the depletion 
literature has unnecessarily restricted itself to a handful of tasks. For example, one could 
also examine depletion effects with the Simon task, the Flanker task, the stimulus-re-
sponse compatibility task, the Stop-signal task, or the Go/go-no task. Especially the Stop-
signal task is in theory ideally suited to study depletion, as correct task processing is 
highly dependent on inhibition. Fourthly, task-switching paradigms have never been con-
nected to depletion research. While the dual-task paradigm examines effects of engaging 
in one task after the other, participants in task-switching paradigms have to rapidly and 
repeatedly switch between two (or more) tasks. Fifthly, there is also little integration of 
research on depletion and mental fatigue. This phenomenon is examined by measuring 
continuous performance on a single task for up to two hours (Boksem, Meijman, & Lorist, 
2006; Hockey & Earle, 2006). It seems that mental fatigue, although very similar to self-
control exertion on a conceptual, takes much longer to impair performance. It could be 
that switching to a new set of task rules propagates performance drops. This would be in 
sline with our propositions from the second study, namely that sustained connectivity 
between task-related areas after depletion hinders adjusting to new task demands. This 
hypothesis could be tested by comparing performance changes in single-task (no task 
switch), dual-task (one task switch), and task-switching (multiple task switches) para-
digms. Performance decrements should appear the fastest for a condition with multiple 
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task switches, and slowest for a condition with no task switch. Sixthly, the proposed mech-
anism of depletion effects, namely that sustained connectivity between regulatory and 
task-specific areas temporarily hampers the capability of regulatory areas to switch their 
influence to other brain areas and thus to adjust to new task demands, is preliminary and 
should be examined further. Brain connectivity measurements have so far been mainly 
employed during states of rest, yet it has been suggested that task-based connectivity is 
possible and reliable (Smith et al., 2009; Whitfield-Gabrieli & Nieto-Castanon, 2012). Thus 
our proposition could be tested more directly by examining connectivity during the first 
and second task in the dual-task paradigm. Seventhly, individual differences have re-
ceived little attention so far, although differences in trait self-control and a few depletion 
studies (Job et al., 2010; Salmon, Adriaanse, De Vet, Fennis, & De Ridder, 2014) suggest 
that differences in depletion susceptibility might play an important role in explaining the 
effect. Eighthly, depletion effects have so far not been studied in clinical populations, alt-
hough altered impulse control is a core symptom of some mental disorders. On the one 
hand, patients with anorexia nervosa demonstrate astounding self-control, with hardly 
any failure to restrain calorie intake. Critically, they are also successful in periods of hun-
ger, which might share some similarities with states of depletion. Neuroscientific studies 
have reported increased connectivity among regions implicated in cognitive control and 
less subcortical reactivity to rewards (Cowdrey, Filippini, Park, Smith, & Mccabe, 2014; 
Wierenga et al., 2015). Hence one could examine if anorectic patients are less susceptible 
to depletion effects. On the other hand, patients with addictive disorders might be partic-
ularly susceptible to depletion. One of the biggest problems in treatment is the high oc-
currence of relapses, which might be related to states of self-control depletion. Ninthly 
and last, a shortcoming of the self-control exertion research is that all findings stem from 
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laboratory experiments. Self-reports suggest that self-control exertion has negative con-
sequences on subsequent self-control attempts in real-life situations (Hofmann, Vohs, & 
Baumeister, 2012). Yet there is no study which makes a direct connection between self-
control exertion as measured in the lab, and behavior in everyday life.  
For example, addressing points seven to nine, an interesting endeavor could be to 
study depletion effects in smokers who want to quit. Adapting an individual differences 
approach, one could investigate the predictive power of depletion sensitivity measured in 
a controlled lab setting for self-control behavior in everyday life. Focusing on smokers 
would have the advantage that there would be a clear marker of self-control in the real 
world: the number of smoked cigarettes. For analogous reasons, dieters or drug users 
would also be ideal clinical study populations. In the first part of the study, self-control 
and self-control exertion would be measured with the dual-task paradigm. Participants 
would have to down-regulate their desire to smoke (craving) while pictures of cigarettes 
and people smoking would be presented, once after a self-control demanding task (self-
control exertion condition), and once after a control task (control condition). A within-
subject design would be advantageous to be able to control for variability in baseline brain 
activity and with regard to statistical power in general. With the help of fMRI measure-
ments and a focus on limbic areas related to impulsive behavior (e.g. nucleus accumbens) 
and lateral prefrontal areas implicated in control, one could quantify participantsǯ success 
in controlling their craving. Next, similar to Hofman, Vohs, and Baumeister (2012), expe-
rience sampling would be used to assess current exertion of self-control, temptations, and 
consumption (smoked cigarettes) several times daily. With multi-level model analyses 
similar to Berkman, Falk, and Lieberman (2011), one could examine if the neural data 
moderates the connection between temptations at one time point and consumption at the 
Conclusion 
138 
next time point, and if the neural data predict overall consumption. One could also exam-
ine whether measuring regulation in a state of self-control exertion can explain more var-
iance in the real-life data than measuring self-control in the control condition. This would 
be interesting because it would test how meaningful self-control exertion effects are for 
everyday life.  
 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
Self-control is one of the most important psychological predictors for success in 
life (Duckworth, 2011). Research suggests that self-control strength fluctuates over time. 
Specifically, individuals are worse at self-control if they had to control themselves previ-
ously (Hagger et al., 2010). The strength model explains these findings by referring to a 
self-control resource, which becomes depleted with use and replenishes during rest 
(Baumeister, 2014). This model has been criticized and various alternative models have 
been proposed, which reject the resource concept in favor of motivational explanations 
for self-control failure (Inzlicht et al., 2014; Kool & Botvinick, 2014; Kurzban et al., 2013). 
We conducted three fMRI studies on depletion. In the first study, we manipulated partic-ipantsǯ task motivation in addition to their level of self-control exertion. Here we found 
the usual depletion effect, such that performance was worse after prior self-control exer-
tion. Boosting motivation led participants to overcome the negative consequences of de-
pletion, as has been reported previously. On the neural level, we did not find that 
motivation canceled out depletion effects, as would be suggested by motivational models 
of self-control. Instead, motivation and depletion effects had interacting effects on brain 
activity. This finding is only reconcilable with the assumption of a self-control resource 
and thus provides support for the strength model. Nevertheless, the physiological basis 
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of the self-control resource remains unclear. In the second study, we examined effects of 
self-control exertion on a subsequent resting state. Measuring brain connectivity pro-
vided a unique opportunity to study depletion effects in the absence of further task en-
gagement. We found that emotion suppression led to increased connectivity between the 
IFG and middle temporal gyrus. Both areas are critically involved in emotion regulation. 
This might reflect sustained connectivity from previous task engagement, suggesting that 
depletion effects might be related to a temporarily reduced capacity of regulatory areas, 
such as the IFG, to change their influence to other brain areas. The third study intended 
to extend effects of self-control exertion on emotional processing to memory formation. 
It has been reported that depletion increases emotional reactivity in the amygdala 
(Wagner & Heatherton, 2013). This area is critically involved in encoding of emotional 
experiences to memory and we thus hypothesized that depletion should enhance emo-
tional memory. Even though our study design was based on the fMRI study which re-
ported increased amygdala reactivity after self-control exertion, we found no evidence for 
this effect. Consequently, emotional memory was also unaffected by the depletion manip-
ulation. We concluded that increases in amygdala reactivity might not be a reliable con-
sequence of self-control exertion. A review of fMRI studies revealed that depletion effects 
are mainly found in the IFG and MFG, which are implicated in regulatory processes and 
attentional control/response selection, respectively. These areas are main hubs within 
the cognitive control network (Nee et al., 2007) and their high-level functionality supports 
the assumption of a domain-general self-control resource. However, not all of my study 
projects were successful at inducing depletion, which is mirrored by an emerging debate 
about the reliability of depletion effects. Meta-analytic tests suggest that the depletion ef-
fect has been overestimated due to a publication bias. Correction techniques arrive at 
widely different estimations of the magnitude of the depletion effect (Carter et al., 2015; 
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Inzlicht et al., 2015). Future research should thus focus on replicating published depletion 
studies and on implementing studies with high statistical power by using big samples and 
exploring within-subject designs. If replication projects produce significant effect sizes, it 
would be interesting to see studies which connect depletion to real-life outcomes and 
which explore ways to assess self-control exertion ǲoutsideǳ of the dual-task paradigm. 
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03/2015 Consciousness & Metacognition Lab (Prof. Hakwan Lau), UCLA, Los 
Angeles, CA, USA:  
Oral presentation „Studying self-control with fMRI“ 
GRANTS 
 
11/2015 Edmond & Lily Safra Center for Brain Sciences (ELSC), The Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem, Israel: 
Competitive travel grant covering travel and accommodation to attend the 
2016 ELSC Annual Retreat 
05/2015 EMDO foundation, Zurich:  
CHF 20’000 for a research project on “Impacts of self-control exertion on co-
caine consumption” 
02/2015 University of Zurich, Department of Psychology:  
CHF 1’000 (Travel grant) to attend CNS Meeting 2015 
02/2014 Swiss Federal Institute of Technology & University of Zurich, Neuro-
science Center Zurich: 
CHF 1’000 (Travel grant) to attend CNS Meeting 2014 
Curriculum Vitae 
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REVIEW WORK 
 
02/2015 Ad-hoc reviewer for Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 
TEACHING EXPERIENCE 
 
02/2015 – 08/2015 University of Zurich:  
Lecturer of the seminar “Neuroscience applied to clinical and social-psycho-
logical topics” 
04/2013 – 06/2014 University of Zurich: 
Supervision of two master projects 
COMPUTER SKILLS 
 
Matlab, SPSS, Mendeley 
fMRI: SPM, Presentation Software 
EEG: Brainvision Analyzer, LORETA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
